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PREFACE
This volume of the Study Final Report consolidates
the findings of investigations on concepts and techniques
in automated performance verification. The investigations
were undertaken to provide additional insight into the design
methodology and to develop a consolidated technology base from
which to analyze performance verification design approaches.
As the title implies, the bulk of this volume is
dedicated to relating concepts. Communication has been given
priority over writing form, so the presentation throughout
the volume is informal. The material has been developed with
digital processor implementation in mind. It has, however,
also been kept as general as possible so that it may contribute
to the widest possible applications.
Much of the material is based on a design handbook
prepared for the Kennedy Space Center which addresses a re-
lated problem and should be referenced for additional detail.*
In view of the Orbiter SM design evolution, a dis-
tinction between performance monitoring and performance
verification might be appropriate here. The former connotes
the presentation of performance parameters, whereas the latter,
performance verification, connotes the presentation of whether
these parameters are acceptable or not. The latter is a more
significant operation in that it includes decision regarding
operational integrity. This volume addresses performance
verification, and in particular, the problem of presenting
functional failure information.
*Handbook, Design of Automated Redundancy Verification, Ford
Hasslinger, Moreno, July 1971, Radiation, Inc. 7620-71-001,
NTIS No. CR 125311.
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GLOSSARY
False Alarm-A performance verification error committed
when an IBV is declared unacceptable when it is
actually acceptable.
IBV -Acronym for Item Being Verified. Associated with each
IBV is a single verification instance and status
indication.
Measure of Performance--'A verification signal which repre-
sents how well an IBV is performing.
Miss -A performance verification error committed when an
unacceptable IBV is not declared as such within a pre-
defined notification time.
MOP--Acronym for Measure of Performance.
Notification Time -- The time interval between the point where
an IBV actually becomes unacceptable and the point where
the performance verification system declares this
condition.
Performance Monitoring--The process of displaying performance
measures of principal system elements.
Performance Verification-- The process of determining whether
a principal system element is performing satisfactorily.
Performance Verification implies a decision process.
Performance Verification System-The system which accomplishes
performance verification.
Post-Decision Smoother-- A smoothing mechanism which makes
status decisions beased on consecutive decisions from
a preceding performance measure limit checker.
Predecision Smoother-- A smoothing mechanism which operates
on a performance measure prior to a status decision.
For computer applications, these will typically be
recursive filters.
Principal System-- The system whose operation is being veri-
fied. The system which ,contains equipment whose status
is to be identified.
PVS_Acronym for Performance Verification System.
Redundancy- The capacity of having more than one way to
accomplish the same function where the alternative
methods may assume the function within a prescribed
time. So long as the alternative' method is.acceptable
(in some sense), there is no implication of equivalent
capability.
Smoothing--The process of deleting anomalies or transients
from an information stream. In the context of
Performance Verification, smoothing is the process used
to decrease false alarm status decision.
Status--A qualitative and usually broad statement regarding
the operational integrity of the item under contention,
e.g., good, marginal, poor; go/no-go.
Status Resolution--The process of identifying the correct
IBV status when several related IBV's all indicate an
unacceptable condition due to failure in the one IBV.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Design of performance verification systems, like
the weather, is much talked about and little done about.
With increasing frequency, vestiges.of designs crop up here
and there--especially in the aircraft industry. The demand
(or need) is obviously increasing. Unfortunately, many of
these designs have been approached as special problems to be
addressed after all other design has been completed--or in
some cases is actually in the prototype stages. The designs
almost always are realized due to the dedicated efforts of
cockpit designers and avionics designers who custom fit each
indication, solving each problem as it comes up. This is a
reflection, not on the designers, but rather on the tools with
which they have to work. Why is performance verification a
problem? Haven't all the rough spots been worked out with
experience gained in such systems as the Apollo Automatic
Checkout, the Navy's VAST and numerous other checkout systems?
With few exceptions, such designs either verify logical
sequences of events or operate on a stimulus-response basis
for performance testing. They do not make real-time decisions
regarding performance while the item being checked is actually
performing its function. Designs incorporating real-time
performance verification on an automated basis are just coming
of age. Probably the field which contains the most precedence
is that of real-time process control. This field has been
doing performance verification for years. The purpose of this
volume is to capitalize on portions of the process control and
related disciplines to structure a general theory of perform-
ance verification. This is accomplished by advancing a design
approach as well as design criteria. General application of
real-time performance verification to a large, sophisticated
system demands more than happenstance design. It demands a
formal approach. Designers must be able to assess and control
risks. They must be able to identify what is to be verified.
In order that the material will be of maximum,
immediate benefit, a verification process has been structured.
An overview of this process and the verification problem at
large is provided in Sections 2.0 and 3.0. Section 4.0 de-
scribes a design structure for accomplishing a verification
design. Specific components of the methodology are detailed
in Sections 5.0-through 8.0. Summary and Conclusions appear
in Section 9.0.
The developed methodology is applied in an example
using the Orbiter Hydraulics System. This example is contained
in Appendix A. Appendix B contains detailed discussions of
performance verification techniques.
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2.0 WHAT IS PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION?
It is appropriate to begin by defining performance
verification. As used in this report, performance verification
is the process of determining the operational integrity, in a
timely manner, of specific system functions with emphasis on
this determination while the function is performing mission
operations. To advance the definition a step further, the
term operational integrity implies knowledge of more than just
the value of a function variable, e.g., 40 pounds of thrust.
Rather, it implies a measure be inherent to verification which
indicates how well the function is performing. Unfortunately,
achieving this measure is only half the story. Of immediate
interest to the crew (and to related functions) is whether the
function is performing satisfactorily or not. When a few
independent functions are involved, performance measures can
be displayed and the crew can determine if they are operating
"good enough." As functional relationships increase and the
number of functions grows, this procedure quickly places a
sizable burden on the crew. The solution;. automate. Thus,
performance verification will also contain a judgment process
which decides whether a performance measure is acceptable or
not. This discrete performance indication is termed status
and, as will become evident in subsequent discussions, has the
added advantage of logical manipulation.
To recap, the performance verification process de-
termines status (acceptable, unacceptable operation) of speci-
fied functions by making quantitative decisions regarding the
value of a function performance measure (or measures). Arriving
at a suitable performance measure is seldom easy and implementing
this measure can become complex. These are the first contrib-
utors to cost and complexity. There are more. Functions often
change operating modes withtime. This typically implies
additional performance measures be defined and developed.
Functions are not always exhaustively exercised throughout a
mission, which implies that only portions ofthe function are
checked--especially if nonlinearities areinvolved. If this
is insufficient, added sophistication will be required.
As indicated, performance verification is a decision
process. Mankind has not yet devised a method of providing
decision-makers with flawless information on which to base
the decision. Where decisions are made, errors will also be
made. And, therein lies the risk which is assumed when auto-
mated performance verification is implemented. In the final
analysis the systems designer is trading off timely information
about the state of his system,against the possibility that this
information may not always be correct. Stated another way, he
is trading off ignorance of system state, or the operator
burden of reducing this ignorance, against an automated but
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imperfect state determination. Possibility of error is being
exchanged for timely information and/or reduced operator
burden. Objectively, information errors are the price paid
for the added information. Is the price worth it? This
fundamental question should be asked about each instance of
verification contemplated. What are the consequences of
manual verification or waiting until the crew discovers a
failed function? -for they will, with certainty, eventually
do so.
There is, however, one additional aspect of operator
failure detection which must be considered in the tradeoff.
This is the necessity of the operator to resolve ambiguities
which may be present. Symptoms, not causes, are observed by
an operator. If subsequent operator corrective action depends
on identifying the specific function which failed, ambiguous
symptoms will require on-the-spot troubleshooting to effect
this identity. Thus, this troubleshooting must be made simple
and/or the symptoms unambiguous.
Redundancy design too, can affect the decision of
whether to use automated verification. If switching is used to
change on-line elements in a redundant set and further, if the
function demands a rapid recovery rate, automated verification
will be essential.
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3.0 APPROACHING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM
What is involved in the automated verification of
performance? Certainly it is more than testing a collection
of system measurements for limit values. It may not be
practical to set a limit on a measurement (independently) or
to attach a functional or physical meaning to the test re-
sults. What about false alarms or misses? What about
erroneous outputs from a failed function causing subsequent
"good" functions to appear failed? How are the results to
be presented? How much interpretation is required on the part
of the crew? What specific functions are to be verified? How
are these selected? How are off-line functions to be handled?
These are but a few of the questions which arise on first
examination of the problem. The material presented in this
volume is intended to provide a structured approach to the
design of an automated performance verification system. The
approach is one of breaking the problem into manageable pieces
which are recognized as disciplines in their own right. De-
.sign considerations are then provided for each piece. Synthesis
of the pieces is treated in Section 4.0 andis woven as a theme
throughout the volume.
The first and major cleaving of the problem is keyed
to the contrast between those things which characterize the
principal system and those things which characterize the design
of the performance verification system.* This is portrayed in
Figure 3.0. The former establishes what is to be verified
and the nature of this verification. It provides design re-
quirements for the verification design. The latter is the
design realization which meets these requirements. Section 3.1
below discusses the principal system characterization and 3.2,
performance verification design. Sections 7.0 and 5.0 address
these subjects in detail.
3.1 Principal System Characterization
What is the nature of the thing to be verified and
what are the verification requirements? A partial answer to
this question is to be found in the conceptual system docu-
mentation. Here'are established mission profiles, requirements
definitions, operations requirements/policies, design philos-
ophies, user interfaces, and broad specifications of the over-
all system as seen by the user. From these documents can be
extracted requirements definitions for the verification system.
In the case of the Orbiter mission profile, SM is seen to
*So that the performance verification system can be distin-
guished from that which it is verifying, the latter is termed
the principal system.
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Figure 3.0. The First Partition
operate in a minimum of three potential modes corresponding
to preflight, flight and post-flight. It is quite likely
that verification interests will differ for each mode. In
fact, this interest will likely vary for the various phases
during flight. Thus, SM will be required to adapt to mission
phase. The concept of SM evolution through Orbiter develop-
ment phases also establishes a flexibility and growth require-
ment on the applications programs, computer time line and the
operating system. Descriptions of principal system functions
will provide:
a. Response time requirements of the performance
verification system (PVS), i.e., how long it
takes to react,
b. Gross requirements of PVS accuracy or confi-
dence (false alarm and miss tolerance),
c. Definitive operating modes under which
functions must be verified,
d. How frequently a function must be verified
and when,
e. Performance criteria on which to base
measures of operational integrity.
The above enumeration is a good checklist for verification
design data. In any well conceived system, much of the
necessary information already exists and need only be re-
formulated in terms of PVS requirements.
We have thus far established a source of PVS perform-
ance requirements which provide the initial definition of, and
constraints on, the design. The system is beginning to take
form. It now remains to identify what in the principal system
is to be verified. There are two obvious extremes to this
question. One is to display status of every subassembly on
board the Orbiter. The other is a single display which indi-
cates whether the Orbiter as a whole is operative or not. The
final solution will without question lie between these ex-
tremes. The former represents an unnecessarily complex system
and presents an unmanageable data resolution problem on the
crew. In addition, it has been indicated that performance
verification is -inherently a decision process. The large
number of decisions exemplified by the former approach can
only increase the overall probability of committing verifica-
tion errors. The latter approach may be acceptable under some
particular circumstances, such as just prior to lift-off. It
rarely, however, provides enough information for the crew to
make an intelligent decision regarding alternative courses of
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action. A single status indication for a complex system
rarely makes sense when applied throughout the mission. A
system GO for launch is different than that for injection and
still different from that of orbital extraction. A system
as complex as the Orbiter employs different functions and
different operating modes as a mission progresses. The con-
text of system GO changes. Finally, it is virtually im-
possible to determine a single system measure of performance
on which to base system status. Such indications are in-
evitably made up of combinations of numerous smaller status
indications, e.g., countdown checklists.
How then does one decide on what is to be verified
and constrain the quantity of these items to a "reasonable"
number? It is imperative that what is being verified be
specifically identified. Is it the entire S-band communica-
tions or just an S-band transmitter? This identifies to
the crew exactly what portion of the system the status display
represents. This specific identification is also the only
way that performance criteria can be established and require-
ments can be apportioned to the verification system. The
specific items are called Items Being Verified (IBV's) and
each represents an independent instance of verification with
its associated independent status. This division or parti-
tioning of the principal system is depicted in Figure 3.1.
There is an optimum (at least in a qualitative
sense) IBV set for each system. Section 7.0 provides details
on ways of arriving at this optimum and these will not be
pursued here. For reasons of cost, complexity and decision
errors, the number of IBV's should be quite small (equating
to large functions being verified). Also contributing to
verification of large functions is the level of status
significance. The IBV should be as large as the significance
or consequence of failure. There is little point in dis-
playing the status of a nonredundant receiver IF, for when
it fails, so does the entire receiver. Here, no corrective
action can be taken to recover from failure of a piece of
the receiver, so status of the entire receiver is more
meaningful and requires less interpretation on the part of
the crew. This example points out two other considerations
in IBV determination. First, redundancy (or ability to repair)
displays a key role in the determination. The presence of
redundancy always represents a recovery mechanism and the
institution of recovery is a principal reason for verification.
Also, the crew will be vitally interested in their chances of
completing a mission phase prior to committing to that phase.
The amount of redundancy present is a direct measure of their
potential success.
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Figure 3.1. The Second Partition
The second consideration brought out by the above
example is that the IBV's should be at the same level of
significance as that for which the crew can do something
about a failure, i.e., the level of recovery. In the example,
the crew could do nothing about the failure of the receiver
IF but can recover from receiver failure by using a redundant
unit.* IF status is not consistent with recovery level. If
the IBV is lower than the recovery level, extraneous infor-
mation is introduced. If it is larger than recovery level,
ambiguities will result. And, this leads directly into the
considerations which motivate increasing the number of IBV's,
i.e., implementing (for the same system) smaller IBV's. For
any system as complex as the Orbiter, graceful (hopefully)
degradation will begin to occur as functions fail. The sys-
tem's capabilities (or potential capabilities) begin to
deteriorate albeit the system at large is still functioning.
"acceptably." IBV's should be sufficiently small to allow
an accurate portrayal of this deterioration. They should be
of an equivalent "granularity" to the equipment degradation
process. For example, each mass memory aboard the Orbiter
should be an IBV since failure of one does not constitute
total loss of the mass memory function. The operating system
(OS) has more than a casual interest in'the status of its
resources. When a mass memory fails, the OS will undoubtedly
resort to new storage/retrieval algorithms and an adjusted set
of priorities. This IBV selection is in consonance with the
degradation granularity and, accordingly, provides unambiguous
information upon which recovery can act directly. An alter-
native approach would be to treat the entire mass memory
function as an IBV. In principal, this would be a perfectly
acceptable approach. It would, however, not be consistent
with the degradation granularity-- especially as recovery must
account for equipment within an IBV thus defined.
Extrapolating the above results, one may conclude
that all redundancy should be verified. There is obviously a
practical limit to how far down into the circuitry verification
should go. In general, real-time verification of redundant
P.C. cards is seldom warranted--especially if this redundancy
is self-recovering, i.e., hardwired. Aside from the complexity
this introduces, the efficacy of the verification is limited
since, likely, the reliability of equipment at this level will
be such that there is a very low probability of failure during
the mission. This is as it should be for unverified equipment.
If there is not a low probability of failure for all such
*An extension of this conclusion relates to deferred mainten-
ance. Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary,
IBV's should not be established to facilitate ground repair
after flight.
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unverified redundancy taken as a whole, the redundancy
design should be seriously questioned. The preceding dis-
cussion should by no means be construed to imply that some
redundancy will never be verified. All redundancy should be
verified during preflight checkout. The task of keeping tabs
on this redundancy once checkout is completed, however, should
not in all cases be a function of performance verification.
Before departing this topic, there is a final point
which should be made. Section 7.0 contains a discussion of
status deduction wherein status of equipment within IBV's
can sometimes be deduced based on logical combinations of
alternative tests and IBV status indications. We will not
dwell on this subject here. Suffice it to say that there are
ways of determining equipment status without actually going
to the expense of directly verifying it. This in effect
extends the power of a single instance of verification.
3.2 The Verification Process
The preceding section indicated where the perform-
ance verification system requirements originate, the implica-
tion of these requirements and how IBV's are selected and
identified. This section will describe how the instance of
verification associated with each IBV thus identified is con-
structed. A detailed discussion of the material presented here
in capsule form will be found in Section 5.0.
What operations must be performed for automated
performance verification? Let us begin by recalling (Section
2.0) what automated performance verification is.... the pro-
cess of determining the operational integrity, in a timely
manner, of specific system functions with emphasis on this
determination while the function is performing mission oper-
ations. With the added material in Section 3.1, we can now
be more specific and state that it is the process of de-
termining status of an IBV in a timely manner by making
quantitative decisions regarding the value of its performance
measure (or measures). This is depicted in Figure 3.2-1 as
a third level of partitioning. Two operations are obvious
from the definition alone: performance measure extraction
and decision making. In the former, the word, extraction,
has not been arbitrarily chosen. Once an IBV performance
measure has been selected, it is quite likely that the process
will involve more than a direct comparison of a transducer
value with a stored limit, especially in the discrete time
domain of a digital computer. To better understand this state-
ment, let us examine some general performance measures, what
implementation restrictions they impose and how the process can
be handled.
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Figure 3.2-1. The Third Partition
Performance measures are quite sensitive to the type
of function being measured and, except for implementation
realization, have no theoretical bounds. Realization restric-
tions are:
a. The measure must be quantifiable, i.e., one must
be able to describe it by numbers. This is
seldom a problem for most physical measures un-
less they become complex, consisting of a
loosely coupled combination of element measures.
For example, one can identify dependability as
a performance measure for a communication system.
This has intuitive appeal but obviously is so
broad that any numbering scheme assigned would
be arbitrary. One could further qualify depend-
ability and state as a performance measure: the
percent of error-free messages transacted which
were delayed no more than one minute. This is
quantifiable.
b. One must have access to the constituent
properties and combine them in a consistent and
logical manner. Said another way, one must be
able to extract the basic properties (or dimen-
sions) of the measure and construct the measure
of performance from these properties. In the
communications system example above, the rules
for combining the basic properties are clear.
Achieving the basic properties, viz., number
of messages with errors, total number of mes-
sages transacted and delay of each message, is
feasible but non-trivial. Assuming one can
get electrical connection (or software linkage)
to the proper places, each property can be
accumulated.
c. One must be able to state the range of values
which constitute acceptable or satisfactory
operation. A performance measure, or measures,
must satisfy the crew that it is an adequate
indicator of IBV operational integrity. Further-
more, they must be satisfied that the threshold
set for acceptable operation is a suitable indi-
cation of when they can depend on the IBV. In
the communications example one must be able to
state the percent of error-free messages not
delayed more than one minute,below which system
operation will be considered unacceptable.
d. The measure must be that which is most representa-
tive of the function being performed by the IBV.
Rate of liquid oxygen being pumped is a measure
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of rocket engine performance but this indi-
cator alone would not satisfy most people as
a sole performance measure. What does a rocket
engine do? It provides a minimum thrust along
a prescribed vector at a predetermined time.
The thrust vector and timing can-be readily
relegated to navigation and guidance functions,
leaving minimum thrust as the respresentative
performance measure. An "almost direct" method
of thrust indication can be achieved by chamber
pressure measurements or gimbal strain measure-
ments.
e. The performance measure must be such that it is
responsive, yet not volatile. By responsive,
we mean that the measure must lend itself to
being implemented such that a status change will
be displayed with minimum delay (from when the
change actually occurred). An implementation
can be considered responsive if the status
(change) delay approaches the natural period
of the IBV. By volatile is meant the imple-
mentation is susceptible to transient conditions,
i.e., hypersensitive. The manifestation of this
condition is false alarms. The manifestation of
sluggish (nonresponsive) operation is misses.
This restriction introduces dynamics into the
verification problem and it is dynamics which
contrast real-time performance verification with
automatic checkout systems. The latter is
strictly a static system. The performance
measure for the communications system example in
(a). above is not quite complete, for it contains
no dynamical restrictions. Should the percent
of error-free messages be calculated over a
daily (24 hr.) basis, an hourly basis or instan-
taneously? Since the nature and density of the
traffic typically varies during a day, there
will be a difference in these approaches. In
effect, we are asking the duration over which an
averaged sample should be taken. Selecting a
daily basis will provide a good indication of
operational integrity but if performed literally
will result in very sluggish reporting of status
change. This can be speeded up considerably by
placing the restriction of a daily moving average
which is determined, say, every 15 minutes. An
instantaneous approach would be quite responsive,
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but would also be volatile. In addition, the
variation of message density may require such
an approach to be adaptive.
This problem cannot be solved here for its
solution depends on operations restrictions on
the system. The example, however, should point
out the necessity of dynamic considerations.
The above realization restrictions should provide
guidelines in selecting performance measures and should point
out the difficulties which can be encountered. Real-time
performance verification is, inescapably, a statistical problem
involving sample sizes, averaging, goodness of fit, corre-
lation, decision mechanisms (hypothesis testing), etc.
Implicit to the above restrictions is the necessity
of extracting from the IBV the most information for minimum
cost. And, by "most information" we mean that information
which comes the closest to satisfying.the performance measure
and which relates performance of the IBV as a whole. In the
realm of nuts and bolts this information must be extracted
from IBV signals, where a signal is any modulated physical
property, not necessarily an electrical waveform. Further-
more, IBV output signals will, with few exceptions, come the
closest to describing the IBV performance as a whole. For,
it is the output of a device which comes closest to completely
describing its function. From an implementation standpoint,
one must structure a performance measure signal (although it
will actually be a sequence of numerical representations in
the case of a digital computer) from information contained in
IBV output signals. This information may not always be in the
form desired of a performance measure and consequently require
manipulation. We saw an example of this earlier where the
number of error messages were tabulated and, in effect,
averaged over a period of time. Averaging is certainly not
the only operation that can be performed on the signals (or
data). A navigation system might be interested in Root-
Mean-Squared error. Other systems may require the performance
measure be expressed as Integral-Squared error. In fact, any
of the statistical or probabilistic operations appearing in
the literature is a reasonable candidate. The key lies in the
concise measure of performance selected and in our ability to
make definitive statements regarding what constitutes acceptable
and unacceptable operation of an IBV.
In expressing performance measures which meet the
realization restrictions cited earlier, one is often confronted
with the inability to make a definitive statement regarding
acceptable operation without first making reference to another
IBV or to that IBV input. Assuming the performance measure
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were, simply, output volts, it would be nice if one could
state the range of acceptable operation (decision rule) in
terms of this output voltage alone. For example, the
decision rule could be,
-4.0: output volts :8.2 =>acceptable,
unacceptable otherwise.
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. It may be that
a definitive statement about IBV performance can only be made
with respect to another IBV or with respect to that IBV's
input. (Note that, in the final analysis, status can only
be decided upon using definitive statements about performance.
The performance criteria, must be manipulated such that de-
finitive statements can be made.) An example of the former
might be that an IBV will be considered acceptable if its
output is within 0.6 volt of a second, identical IBV. Two
redundant navigation systems might be considered operative
if the RMS difference between their normal reckoned positions
remained within 7.0 meters over a one-hour period. In the
case of output with respect to input, consider a voltage
amplifier. The performance measure could easily be the ratio
of output to input volts. The decision rule could then be:
9X (input volts) 5 output =>acceptable,
unacceptable otherwise.
It is worthy to note that the decision rules used
to judge IBV operation will likely represent a dividing line
between very good performance under ideal conditions and
good-to-marginal performance. Under emergency conditions, the
crew will likely be willing to accept much worse performance.
A second, emergency set of decision rules may be well advised
to reassess orbiter status for marginal conditions when
trouble arises.
From all that has been said about performance
measures and IBV's, the reader may have the impression that
each IBV will have a single measure of performance. Can an
IBV have more than one performance measure? Yes. In fact, it
is often easier to handle several, ideally independent,
measures separately and establish a decision rule for each.
This is effectively constraining the problem to canonical or
elemental form and makes the dimensions easier to cope with.
One may not be able to state a decision rule about a single,
complex measure but he can often attach physical and opera-
tional significance to its constituent parts. When several
performance measures are treated in this way, an algorithmic
relationship can be established to relate the status of the
several measures, i.e., good-bad, to that of their IBV. For
example, an IBV may have the following performance measures
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and decision rules for each of the measures:
3.6 5 peak output volts ! 4.8 -->acceptable
kHz 4.0 : frequency < 4.6 kHz =>acceptable
phase I 200 --> acceptable
These rules establish the status definition for each per-
formance measure. It can then be stated that the IBV status
will be considered unacceptable if at least one of the above
measures is unacceptable. This process amounts to synthe-
sizing Measure of Performance (MOP) status indications into
IBV status and is depicted in Figure 3.2-2. Note it is the
reverse of that shown in Figure 3.2-1.
To this point we have discussed the defining,
structuring and implementation of performance measures and
status development. We are now ready to discuss a final point
which has been touched upon frequently and is a direct out-
growth of real-time dynamics. This point is errors. Perform-
mance verification can commit two types of errors. It can
indicate an IBV has failed when, indeed, it has not- a false
alarm. It can also fail to.indicate, within a prescribed
time limit, that an IBV has failed when, indeed, it has- a
miss. The time limit constraint in the definition of a miss
is crucial. If a status change is not indicated in a timely
manner, in many cases it may as well not have been indicated
at all. Except for hardware failure within the performance
verification system, the probability of virtually any design
ultimately indicating an IBV failure will approach unity - if
one waits long enough. Furthermore, the crew itself, will
also ultimately, detect the failure. If response time is not
a consideration, one can seriously question the need for real-
time verification. The remaining virtues are reduction of
crew workload and possible isolation information. Under these
circumstances such verification could be performed as point
checks when mission phases change, perhaps as part of
configuration checks.
Of the two types of errors, false alarms usually
cause the most concern. We shall sketch the avoidance of
false alarms. A detailed discussion will be found in Section
8.0.
False alarms occur due to two principal causes:
hardware/software failure within the performance verification
system and anomalies in the developed performance measure
signal which are misinterpreted by the status decision
mechanism. We shall address the latter, control of the former
being amply treated throughout the literature.
For effective control, the nature of the signal
anomalies should be understood. These can be inherent to the
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Figure 3.2-2. Synthesizing Measure of Performance
Status Into IBV Status
IBV signals in the form of overshoot, transients, crosstalk,
noise, hum, timing/phase deviations, race, etc. A digitally-
implemented performance verification system will introduce,
in addition to some of those mentioned, anomalies arising
from truncation, roundoff and finite word length. Control of
the latter will reside almost exclusively within the software
numerical design. A classic example of this is setting of
the integration interval for a numerical integration problem.
Figure 3.2-3 illustrates what happens to the error as the
interval is made progressively smaller. Error increase past
the minimum is caused by truncation errors as the number of
iterations increases. Control of numerical errors is a study
in its own right and is quite sensitive to machine architec-
ture and the nature of the function being processed. Suffice
it to say that error compensation cannot begin unless:
a. The errors produce an invariant bias which
is known and can be compensated for, and/or
b. The errors do not consistently accumulate
in one direction, i.e., they alternate in
sign.
The goal of error control is to make the IBV status
indications insensitive to all anomalies. Our signal pro-
cessing colleagues would call this a filtering problem and
we shall adopt their descriptive designation. We shall limit
our discussion to filters which reduce random effects (as
opposed to special application filters which compensate for
bias or discrete portions of the frequency spectrum). Such
filtering operations are commonly called smoothing in that
they are low pass mechanisms which suppress rapid or sponta-
neous variations. Section 8.0 contains a detailed treatment
of filtering and false alarm avoidance with emphasis on
digital filtering.
Why are we interested in low pass filters or
smoothers? When an IBV is operating properly, its performance
measure signal will vary somewhat from sample to sample, this
variation being quite small or characterized as "wandering."
This is normal and should cause no problems in a design. If,
however, the performance measure signal has a sudden extrane-
ous point, a false alarm could well be displayed. Smoothing,
then, is a mechanism for reducing false alarms. This smooth-
ing can be accomplished prior to making a status decision or
the status decisions can themselves be smoothed prior to status
display. Predecision smoothing utilizes the wide body of re-
cursive and nonrecursive digital filtering developed over the
past several years. It is a numerical signal processing
algorithm. Post-decision smoothing uses algorithms which
exploit the filtering resulting from multiple event occurrences.
It operates on the theory of recurrent events or runs. Section
8.0 addresses both types of smoothers.
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Figure 3.2-3. Solution Error vs. Numerical
Integration Interval Size
If all one has to do is smooth data to remove
false alarms, isn't the problem solved? By attempting to
solve this problem, we have created a new one. It is true
that in general, the more we smooth, the fewer will be the
false alarms. Smoothing can be regarded as a damping process
and, as is true with all dampers, delay is produced. De-
creasing false alarms will inevitably decrease the likelihood
of a timely notification of failure. This response, often
expressed in delay to reach final value for a step input
(sudden failure), is seldom of no consequence to the system
user. A trade-off will typically be required between re-
sponse time and false alarms. In the case of post decision
filtering, the relationship is essentially the same, the de-
gree of smoothing is traded against the time required to reach
the recursion boundary for a step input.
This completes the verification process. We are now
in a position to determine status of each IBV. Is this status
indication the one which will be displayed to the crew? Not
directly. The functional interrelationships among IBV's also
means that the status thus developed is not independent of
other IBVs' status. This relationship or dependence is the
subject of the following section.
3.3 Status Resolution
Probably the easiest way to see the need for an
intervening step between IBV status as developed above and the
displayed information is by an example. Consider a series
chain of IBV's. Assume the first IBV in the chain fails. The
following IBV will no longer receive a proper input, and, will
not likely provide an acceptable output. This same argument
can be applied successively down the chain. What results is
a host of failed indications from individual IBV's due to the
failure of a single IBV.
The condition in the example cannot be allowed to
remain since it violates one of the basic reasons for employ-
ing automated performance verification. A mechanism must be
introduced which resolves the status indications of IBV's,
selecting the !'truly" failed IBV from several failure indi-
cations. One way of achieving this is store a system map or
functional diagram which relates IBV flow and connections.
Connectivity is.the property we seek. When failed indications
are indicated by IBV status, the status resolver will deter-
mine, based on IBV connectivity, which IBV has actually failed
before any status information is displayed to the crew. In
the above example, status resolution would pick the first IBV
in the series chain as having failed, suppressing the failed
indications from subsequent IBV's. Algorithms can be developed
to take care of all conceivable block configurations (branch
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in, branch out, series, parallel) except closed loops. Reso-
lution within a closed loop will require interrupting the
loop in the system.
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4.0 PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION DESIGN APPROACH
The approach to design of automated performance
verification is implied in the preceding sections. We shall
summarize in this section. Flow of the design is depicted in
Figure 4.0. It should be recognized that the design can,
and will, fold back to preceding blocks as development on
one portion of the design dictates changes in previous
approaches. Appendix A to this volume contains an example
of the design approach by applying the developed concepts
to the design of automated performance verification for the
Orbiter Hydraulics System.
The design begins by concisely identifying all IBV's
such that there is no overlap of function or any ambiguity.
This is the subject of Section 7.0 of this report and is
shown as part of Block 1 in Figure 4.0. The second operation
in this block has been touched on only briefly in this over-
view but is an important ingredient in the process. Recall
that it is sometimes possible to determine the status of
several functions using but a single instance of verification.
It is this phenomenon which is being exploited here. The
reader is referred to Section 7.0 for discussions of this
subject. Suffice it to say that implementations of this sort
should be pursued since they result in a decreased average
processor burden. Block 3 in Figure 4.0 indicates the design
of mechanisms which implement status determination of functions
(here called elements) within an IBV. The mechanisms are
called deduction schemes since they operate on logical
relationships concluded from IBV status indications.
Returning to Figure 4.0, once IBV's have been identi-
fied which satisfy system degradation granularity, safety
considerations and crew procedure cues, performance measures
for each IBV must be developed. This is indicated by Block 2
in the figure. These measures are selected such that they
best describe how well the IBV is performing its job.
Once performance measures are selected, limits must
be set on these measures indicating the bounds of acceptable
operation. These are the decision rules used by the mapper
to determine IBV status from values of the performance
measure. Block 4 indicates this step in the design.
Now that the parameters and design requirements
have been established for each IBV performance verification,
a design must be realized which meets these requirements.
This is indicated in Block 5 as the design of status develop-
ment-we are developing status for each IBV. Not explicitly
shown in the figure is the smoothing operation for reducing
false alarms. This operation is a must and has not been
depicted due to the wide variability of its implementation.
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Considerations in the design of the smoothing operation
are false alarm rate and status response time.
Finally, Block 6 provides for the design integra-
tion and displaying of status. Status resolution design
consists of identifying the principal system connectivity
to the performance verification processor such that multiple
failure indications can be resolved. Once resolution is
effected, the true status indications, some of which are
determined in Block 3, may be reported to a display device
for crew information.
With the overview and design approach having been
described, let us turn our attention to the details of specific
verification components. These are discussed in the remaining
four sections.
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Figure 4.0. Automated Performance Verification Design Process
5.0 VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES AND MEASURES OF
PERFORMANCE
Section 3.2 outlined the verification process and
indicated the need for extracting measures of performance
(MOP's) which are used for making IBV status decisions. Ex-
tracting these MOP's is the key to successful automated
performance verification and is the subject of this section.
Before proceeding with the discussion, it should be obvious
that IBV's must be selected before MOP's can be identified.
This is shown in the design process discussed in Section 4.0.
How IBV's are selected is the subject of Sections 6.0 and 7.0.
MOP extraction is being addressed first in the belief that
it will aid in understanding of the overall. verification
problem. The reader should keep in mind that the order of
these discussions is the reverse of the design process.
A measure of performance is selected in the belief
that its value (numerical representation) best represents
how well an IBV is performing. Also, this measure has the
property that a value can be established which divides ac-
ceptable and unacceptable operation of the IBV. There is no
restriction which forces the MOP to identically be a parameter
of the IBV taken from a transducer. There is also no restric-
tion that an IBV have a single MOP; it may be desirable to
use several if a single measure will simply not be descrip-
tive. The several MOP's, however, describe a good deal more
than a collection of IBV parameters which are limit-checked.
This distinction is important and should become clear in the
following material.
The preceding relates one of the most fundamental
notions regarding MOP's and warrants elaboration. First
attempts at defining IBV performance measures usually in-
volve the selection of numerous measured parameters. Seldom
are all these parameters needed and equally seldom do they
supply an adequate picture of IBV performance. They usually
supply several small pictures which may or may not fit to-
gether to complete the IBV performance indication.
Having realized that "shotgun" parameters may repre-
sent an overkill, the next reaction would quite likely be to
select a single, well chosen parameter as the MOP. Inherently,
this is good practice since it unquestionably represents the
cheapest way to go. There is, however, no guarantee that
(a) there exists such a parameter or (b) that, if it could
be identified, it would qualify as a performance measure. How
can a parameter of an IBV not qualify as a performance measure?
It surely indicates something of IBV behavior. What is wrong
with this approach? Simply stated, it enters the back door
of the problem. It is "solving" the problem in reverse. Let
us address a possible forward approach.
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Realizing that existing instrumentation is a
genuine constraint, let us put this aside for the moment to
consider the approach uninhibited by facts. Once IBV's are
identified, the next step is to define precisely what each
one does; what is its purpose? As often as not, this will be
the signal, energy, material or what not that the next IBV(s)
in the functional sequence are expecting to operate upon or
"see." That is, the output of the IBV. The functional
definition of the IBV, then, is usually the best start. Next
arise a series of questions. Can this function/output be
quantified? What about the dynamics of the function? Can it
be measured while the IBV is performing its function within
the principal system? Can acceptable/unacceptable boundaries
be placed on the measure? Can the measure be derived from
existing IBV information?
We shall take these questions one at a time. If
the IBV function has been precisely defined, so too has the
MOP. What remains is how to extract the MOP. There are
three considerations here. The first is achieving a de-
cision rule which is discussed in Section 5.1. The second
is associated with achieving the MOP under IBV dynamic
operation. This is the subject of Section 5.2. Finally,
Section 5.3 addresses the problem of changing IBV operational
characteristics under alternative operating modes.
5.1 The Influence of Decision Rules on MOP's
This is an appropriate place to stop and reflect
about the use of an MOP. It will be used to make decisions
regarding functional integrity of the IBV. This has been
stated before, but this time we shall examine what it means
from an implementation standpoint. If decisions are to be
made using the value of the MOP, this implies that at any
instant we must be able to state what that.value should be.
We cannot make a decision if there is no basis for the de-
cision, if there is no fixed rule to go by. This factor is
easier to violate than one may first imagine. Consider a
communication channel for which the MOP would reasonably be
the number of message errors. Now all that has to be done
is count the errors and decide if the quantity exceeds a
fixed number. This is fine but for one thing, if we don't
know what the messages are going to be before hand, how do we
know if they are in error. (It is interesting to consider
the value of a communication channel for which one always
knew what its contents would be.) In this case, the MOP
(number of errors) indeed had a fixed decision rule and is,
on the surface, a good communication measure. There is how-
ever, no reference from which to count errors. While a firm
decision rule can be stated, there is no way to achieve the
MOP using only the information contained in the channel. To
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solve this problem, more information is added to the channel
by way of error detecting codes. There is now a way to
detect errors and realize the MOP. The error coding is
deterministic.
This simple example points up two.important con-
siderations. First, it may not be possible to use existing
information in the IBV to realize a MOP. Other information
may have to be added so that it is possible to state what the
MOP should be- and thus be able to make status decisions.
The added information could be pilot tones, pseudorandom
noise, time division multiplexed constants, etc. Decision
rules can then be stated regarding MOP's for these types of
information.
The second consideration pointed up by the example
has to do with references against which to measure the MOP.
In the example, we could not count errors until a deterministic
feature was added. This feature in fact forms a reference on
which the MOP can be based and will be.necessary for every MOP.
In this case we were able to state in absolute terms, that
value above which the number of errors should not go, i.e.,
the decision rule or threshold value. Similarly, we can state
that the value of a power supply voltage must remain within
two definite boundaries. While this set of circumstances
represents the easiest case to implement, it is not always
possible. It may be that, if an MOP is to have a fixed de-
cision rule, reference will have to be made to another part of
the principal system. It may be that the only firm statement
that can be made about an IBV performance involves an MOP
which is referenced to another, similar IBV or to the input
of the IBV. Such cases arise when one is unable to equate
IBV output with its functional definition and at the same time
state firmly what that output should be.
If an IBV's function is regulatory in nature, as in
the case of the power supply cited above, it will usually be
possible to identify an MOP with its output and be able to
state the acceptable range of this output in an absolute
sense. That is, be able to state a decision rule without re-
gard to any other condition in the principal system. Many
of the Environmental Control and Life Support functions
aboard Orbiter will fall into this category. Many functions,
unfortunately, do not operate in quite as neat a manner. If
performance verification is to be practically realized, we
cannot limit its application to the easy functions. We shall
try harder.
Again, the key to IBV verification is an MOP which
has a fixed decision rule. Alternative means of arriving at
this goal have already been mentioned. Consider the class of
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functions which are responsive in nature. Functions in a
command segment are a good example. We cannot state in an
absolute sense what the output of such a function should be.
We can only state that their output should be the execution
of the command which they received. That is, to achieve an
MOP for such functions, we must state the output in terms of
the input. One cannot say that a two degree right rudder is
correct or incorrect until the input command is known. This
is just one application for this class of functions. There
are many more, all of which constitute varying degrees of
sophistication on the same theme. Depending on principal
system structure, such responsive functions will often per-
form transformations on the input command to effect its
execution. Under these circumstances, these transformations,
or their inverse, may have to be duplicated to achieve the
MOP.
There is a third class of functions whose operation
is so complicated that the only practical way an MOP can be
described is to compare the results of two or more such
functions. Digital computers, if rapid response time is
necessary, almost always fall into this category.
The above discussion has been directed at methods
of achieving fixed decision rules for an MOP. Three ways
were identified.
* IBV output with respect to an absolute
value.
* IBV output with respect to its input.
* The comparative outputs of two identical
IBV's.
If one of these methods can be used, we are well along the
way to achieving our purpose. For, to this point we have'
shown that a verification decision is realizable. What re-
mains is the structuring of the MOP to the IBV performance.
There are several recognized techniques for this and they are
discussed in Appendix B. In the appendix, the techniques have
been divided into the classes -of achieving decision rules
developed above. The necessity for status resolution (see
Section 3.2) is also discussed, indicating whether conditional
or unconditional status will likely result from application of
a technique.
5.2 Implications of IBV Dynamics
Recall that the primary objective of performance
verification is to effect this verification while the IBV is
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performing its intended operation in the principal system.
If this objective cannot be achieved, the IBV cannot be
verified in real time. This section will discuss the
implications of real-time verification on MOP selection and
the techniques utilized. Once again, the problem is one of
defining an MOP (or a minimum set of MOP's) which lend
themselves to a fixed and meaningful decision rule.
Dynamical operation was not considered in Section
5.1 as it would have only served to clutter the issue. In
the communication example given there, time was not considered
in the message error MOP. The example of the power supply
likewise did not consider time. The MOP's stated there are
incomplete. In the communication example, the number of
message errors must be stated per unit time (or equivalently,
the number of errors contained in some constant number of
messages). In the power supply example, depending on the
mechanisms using the power, it may well be that an MOP which
is concerned only with a constant voltage tolerance over all
time is an over-simplification. More will be said about this
problem in later paragraphs.
Dynamics affect performance verification from two
almost opposite considerations. One of these considerations
deals with the ability of performance verification to cope
with, or operate effectively in spite of, anomalies which
occur in MOP's resulting from IBV operation and the imple-
mentation environment. Data smoothing or false alarm avoidance
is instituted to deal with this consideration. This is the
subject of Section 8.0 and will not be pursued here except to
mention that it is easy to lose sight of the smoothing ob-
jective. Smoothing is not a substitute for MOP definition
or extraction; it is a mechanism for decreasing decision
errors. These errors originate almost exclusively in the
implementation, e.g., lack of data correlation due to sampled
data implementations, and not from the IBV performance
characteristics.
The second performance verification consideration
resulting from dynamic IBV operation has to do with the
ability to determine operational integrity. This is the
subject of Section 5.2.1. Section 5.2.2 will pursue the same
subject but with emphasis on sampled data implications.
5.2.1 Dynamics and MOP Selection
When an item is being performance tested, as for
example during prelaunch checkout or acceptance testing, we
have complete control of the item inputs, operation and output.
To test a particular performance characteristic, the item is
set up or configured in a prescribed manner and a prescribed,
5-5
simulated input is fed to the item. Its performance is then
checked to verify compliance to specification. While this
is a perfectly legitimate method of performance testing, it
is rarely applicable to automated performance verification.
Automated performance verification is attempting to deter-
mine operational integrity while the.item under consideration
is actually performing an operational task. The traditional
stimulus-response (controlled cause-effect) methods seldom
apply. Performance verification is a harder task. We must
determine with an acceptable confidence whether an item is
operative or not,without benefit of item control. This is
not meant to imply that performance verification will achieve
the same confidence in operational integrity as that of an
acceptance test. It will seldom do so. The only claim that
should be made is that the confidence is sufficient for the
purpose.
Consider the power supply example discussed earlier.
When a precision D.C. supply is bench tested,it first receives
static tests under stepped loads to assure that it holds the
specified voltage tolerance and ripple content over time and
load range. The loads are exclusively resistive, i.e., no
reactive components are used. The regulator dynamic response
is next tested using these same loads. Of interest is the
voltage recovery time and overshoot resulting from step load
changes. These tests are designed almost exclusively to
verify regulator, the most complex portion of any D.C. supply,
operation. Another set of tests will also be performed to
verify ripple and output voltage change due to input
variations.
It is obvious that such tests cannot be performed
on a supply while it is in use. In addition, the load on an
operational supply is reactive which further complicates matters.
It is equally obvious that a simple voltage range check, albeit
smoothed, represents the other extreme of performance verifi-
cation. Any implementation will usually be a compromise be-
tween these extremes, with the actual load power requirements
being the deciding factor. If logic is being powered, dynamic
response is quite important since the load can change.abruptly
at the logic clock rate. Affects of these changes are in
practice reduced by distributed power filters. Also, some
applications of a D.C. supply will, for all practical purposes,
be insensitive to dynamic response. We shall, however,
continue with this example since it is a convenient one and
the results are applicable to any regulating-type IBV.
Interest in power supply dynamics centers about two
parameters: overshoot and recovery. A regulator which has
changed characteristics such that its closed loop gain has
increased will be hypersensitive and overshoot upon step
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recovery. This will cause excessive voltage peaks and
amost always, ringing. Recovery has to do with response
time at step load. The concern is opposite of that above;
it is a sluggish response that is of interest. A good
measure of overshoot is the peak value reached by the output
voltage. Recovery can be measured by some criterion which
expresses the voltage-time product of excursions outside the
voltage tolerance band. Root-Mean-Squared or Integral-
Squared-Difference would both be suitable. The squaring
operation is intended to give large excursions additional
weight.
An alternative to the above is illustrated in
Figure 5.2.1. Here, a single MOP is used which is defined as
the RMS value of all out-of-tolerance excursions. Wave (c)
in the figure shows the final MOP. Note that since averaging
is being effected, there is, for most implementation, a
practical limit on the time over which the average can be
taken. Also, the averaging period is influenced by the
behavior of the waveform being averaged. A waveform similar
to that in Figure 5.2.1(c) can be achieved by an integrate-
and-dump device which is easier to implement than the root-
mean device. The decision rule for this MOP would be stated
in terms of the averaging period RMS out-of-tolerance value,
rather than a voltage threshold corresponding to the maximum
and minimum limits. Figure 5.2.1(d) illustrates the values
which would be observed by a.direct sampling of the original
waveform at sample times corresponding to the ends of the
averaging periods. Note the lack of sensitivity to the voltage
excursions. This type of sampling would be effective in de-
tecting a change in regulator reference voltage but will likely
not detect fluctuations which could cause, for example, errors
in logic. Smoothing the waveform in (d) would only aggravate
the situation. Again, smoothing is not intended to replace
MOP techniques.
The example is intended to demonstrate the develop-
ment and extraction of an MOP. It is likely that an IBV will
be (and should be) larger and more complex than a single
power supply. Whether the MOP should actually be applied to
a power supply depends on a large number of factors. The
cost of the MOP extraction is not trivial and should obviously
be justified by the need. Distributed capacitance throughout
the D.C. distribution goes a long way toward smoothing voltage
peaks but energy is still required to accommodate a sudden
increase in load. The value of maximum and minimum voltage
may well be nominal +10%. For much of today's integrated
circuit technology, this amounts to + -volt. This is a
small value when one considers the susceptability of regulator
sense lines to noise, hum, cross talk, etc.
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Figure 5.2.1. Development of a Power Supply MOP
The selected MOP comes a lot closer to measuring
the dynamic function of a regulated power supply than
simple voltage measurements. This is especially true where
voltage sampling is concerned, which is the topic of the
following section.
The reader should note the broad selection of
verification techniques contained in Appendix B. These tech-
niques are intended to describe possible ways of achieving
MOP's and are far from complete. The combinations and
possibilities are limited only by the designer's imagination.
5.2.2 Implications.of Sampled Data
We shall continue with the power supply example in
Section 5.2.1 above. The implications of sampling the voltage
waveform have already been discussed. If the application is
not sensitive to voltage excursions but only the "average"
voltage, then voltage sampling is probably adequate. This
also implies that a voltage level MOP would also be adequate.
What if the MOP in Section 5.2.1 must be used? Where does
sampling fit in then?
To begin with, it will likely be impractical to
sample at a rate frequent enough to develop the waveforms in
Figure 5.2.1. This implies local (as opposed to CPU) pro-
cessing of the MOP; quite likely in analog form. This will
be the rule rather than the exception for any IBV where the
shape and/or character of its output is important. The CPU
would then sample the RMS values in Figure 5.2.1(c) and
process these values just as it would have processed direct
voltage samples.. In fact, in the example, the averaging
period would correspond to the sampling period.
The local analog processing of MOP's can pose a
serious problem to a system that has not made provisions for
such an eventuality. Required, will be additional sample
time slots for the MOP's (since, in the example, the power
supply voltage will still be of value for other purposes),
physical space for the circuitry, additional power and thermal
control. Unless an adaptive sampling protocol can be imple-
mented, there is likely no compromise between the direct
voltage sampling and the local MOP processing. With direct
parameter sampling, there is no way to achieve information
about the IBV output which occurs, in practice, at fre-
quencies above 1/8 the sample rate. There will certainly
be valid MOP's that can be formed on this basis and there
will, with equal certainty, be MOP's which demand local
processing.
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5.3 Implications of IBV operating Mode Changes
To simplify relationships, all the preceding dis-
cussions addressed verification as though IBV's would re-
main in a single operating mode. This is obviously rarely
true. IBV's will change modes and, if nothing else, will
be turned on and off. It is not possible to verify per-
formance of a powered down IBV. Thus, the performance
verification system must be both notified of this condition
and be able to accommodate it so that the IBV will not be
declared inoperative.
Accommodating operating mode changes is highly
dependent upon the particular IBV and the individual modes.
Some mode changes will allow the continued use of previous
MOP's, reguiring only a change in their decision thresholds.
Others will require different MOP's and still others may
simply delete an MOP. The important result of all this is
that the modes must each be defined, MOP's (along with de-
cision thresholds) must be defined for each and the verifi-
cation system must be able-to adapt automatically upon mode
change signals from the IBV.
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6.0 CRITERIA FOR SELECTING FUNCTIONS TO BE VERIFIED
The purpose of this section is to identify
criteria for selecting Orbiter Subsystem functions which are
most amenable to real-time automated performance verification.
The criteria are intended to be used in conjunction with the
general techniques described in Section 7.0. While the
latter generally identifies items to be verified, the cri-
teria in this section are used to determine how the verifi-
cation is best accomplished, or indeed, if it should even be
accomplished on an automated basis. The performance verifi-
cation techniques identified in Section 5.0 were used as the
basis for determining the criteria.
6.1 Factors Affecting Selection
When identifying criteria for selection of functions
to be verified, there are four factors which must be considered:
a. The operational constraints.
b. Attendant verification programming complexity
and storage requirements.-
c. Implementation.
d. Mission time during which verification is
accomplished.
Each factor represents a different interest in a design
realization and should be considered independently. By doing
so, the criteria can be used not only for selecting functions
for verification but, in a much more positive sense, to guide
the separate design interests in achieving a final design
which is more amenable to verification. Note that attendant
verification programming complexity and storage requirements
(factor b above) is the only factor which is associated
directly with the function itself. The ramaining factors
are associated with how the function is to be used.
The selection criteria appear in Table 6.1 where
they are grouped by the identified factors. As might be ex-
pected, some of the criteria appear under more than one factor.
Each factor, together with its associated criteria, is dis-
cussed in Sections 6.2 through 6.5.
6.2 Function Selection by Operation
This set of criteria deals with the ability of the
crew to:
a. Observe failure symptoms.
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Table 6.1. Function Selection Criteria
FACTOR CRITERIA
A. Operations Select for automated verification, functions:
1. Whose failure is not immediately obvious to the crew.
2. Whose failure may be immediately obvious but the consequences of such a failure will
represent a hazard to crew.
3. Once failed, will require action on the part of the crew for recovery/reconfiguration.
4. Requiring automatic reconfiguration.
B. Programming Select for-automated verification, functions:
complexity and 1. Which do not operate in several modes.
storage re- 2. Whose operation can be judged against a constant value rather than against operation of
quirements another function (relative) or against a calculated variable dependent on time, velocity,
mission phase, etc.
3. Other than command and control.
C. Implementation Select for automated verification:
1. Functions which are relatively large.
2. Functions whose outputs are accessible.
3. Redundant functions whose outputs are discernable.
4. Redundant functions which are identical.
5. Functions not within a closed loop.
D. Frequency of Defer to post-flight verification, functions that:
Verification 1. Are very reliable.
2. Are incidental to safety and/or mission.
3. Can not be reasonably verified real time (due to complexity, confidence, accuracy).
4. The failure of which will result in inability of crew to recover (commitment).
5. The failure of which will not alter the mission or safety when the function is used
during initial portions of flight only.
40'
c!
b. Readily associate the symptoms with a
specific function, and
c. Ability/necessity of the crew to recover
from the failure. Note that recovery
does not necessarily imply replacement
of a failed function in kind. Rather, it
generally implies prevention of disaster
following failure.
If the crew can readily observe the failure symptoms and
uniquely associate these symptoms with a function, there is
little need to incorporate automated verification so long
as failure recovery time is not critical. If recovery time
is critical then automatic recovery, and obviously automated
verification, will be required. If the crew cannot imme-
diately associate symptoms with a unique function, recovery
time will be protracted while the failure is being isolated.
As there are few functions the failure of which
will produce only incidental deleterious effects on safety/
mission, it is safe to assume that the crew requires knowledge
of all failures. Why? The answer resides in the crew's
ability to do something about the degraded state. The crew
will presumably act in a different manner when the Orbiter
is in a degraded state -- defer maneuvering, scrub experiments,
switch in a redundant function. If a state exists which
commits the crew toultimate disaster, i.e., there is nothing
they can do to recover, it is questionable whether they need
even be informed on an automated basis. If an emergency
procedure exists, the crew needs to know the system state
to execute the procedure. If one does not, the crew is no
worse off than if they had no information.
6.3 Function Selection By Programming Complexity And
Storage Requirements
This set of criteria deals with properties of
functions which translate into automated verification pro-
gramming complexity and storage requirements. Consideration
has been given to storage requirements for both program and
data.
Verifying functions that operate in several differ-
ent modes inevitably requires more storage and some added
programming complexity. Such functions require mulitple
verification routines and, typically, mode switching algorithms.
Moreover, additional data must be input and stored to account
for mode changes.
It is easier to verify a function whose operation
can be judged against a constant value rather than a variable
which must be calculated or determined based on several other
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function conditions. The latter requires added programming
sophistication and storage.
Automatic, real-time verification of command and/
or control is always a challenge. Command functions in-
evitably involve, from the standpoint of the verification
equipment, random operations with only sophisticated
correlation functions among events. Stated another way,
command information as a class usually originates from the
crew rather than from within independent operation functions.
As such, there is seldom any basis for automatically verifying
operation except by duplicating the function and comparing
results. Command functions can be verified much more easily
on a manual basis by feedback information which indicates to
the crew the command was actually executed.
Control functions typically suffer from the same
uncertainties characteristic of command. In addition, control
usually operates within closed loops. Automatic verification
within such a loop is quite difficult.
6.4 Function Selection By Implementation
This set of criteria deals with the mechanization
of the functions and its effects on verification. Due to
inevitable error possibility, and due to the fact that it is
often as difficult to verify a small (from a complexity stand-
point) function as a large one, it is better to establish
verification for functions that are as large as possible. For
the same system, this policy reduces the number of verifica-
tion decisions which must be made and consequently decreases
overall verification error. The upper bound on the size of
verified functions is obviously the resolution of the
functional status demanded. Note that this concept can also
be extended to include reliability of the verified functions.
Signals must be extracted from the function being verified
to be used for verification purposes. This extraction in-
volves hardware--sensors, isolators, multiplexers, etc.
The reliability of this hardware should be much greater than
the reliability of the verified function and the easiest way
to achieve this relationship is to verify large and/or
relatively unreliable functions. This last point is based on
an argument advanced earlier that often the instrumentation
requirements for large and small functions are not appreciably
different.
The principal source of information used to judge
the operational integrity of a function is its output. For
this output is the function's reason for being. It should go
without saying that the output must then be accessible to
the verification system. There are numerous reasons why the
output may not be accessible, some of which are:
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a. Multiplexer and sensors were not in-
corporated into the design.
b. Output is electrically/mechanically
"buried" within the system.
c. Due to electrical/mechanical
connections (usually resulting
from redundancy applications), the
output cannot be discerned from that
of another item being verified.
d. Output is so complicated or consists
of so many variables that it is not
practical to be considered accessible.
As indicated in (c) above, the ability to discern
outputs of redundant functions is important. If it is re-
quired to know which function in a redundant set has failed,
the outputs must be discernable. "Hardwired" redundancy is
perhaps the largest single offender of this principle as the
outputs form a single electrical node.
To carry the above notion one step further, it is
usually easier to verify redundant functions which are
identical (as opposed to those which provide lesser capa-
bility in the event of prime function failure). Under these
circumstances one seldom cares which function is failed so
long as he knows how many have failed. The outputs then do
not have to be discernible. In addition, a single algorithm
can be used for verification, thus reducing programming and
storage requirements.
Section 6.3 above indicated the problems involved
when attempting to verify functions within a loop.
6.5 Function Selection By Frequency Of Verification
This set of criteria deals with how often the
function can be verified. Not all functions need be verified
on a continuous basis.* Some may be used only periodically,
others for one brief period during the mission and still
others may be reliable enough and/or noncritical enough to
warrant lengthy response times and risk of not detecting a
failure as soon as it occurs. The ultimate in verification
frequency is a one-time thorough verification at the be-
ginning of the mission. The implications of this approach
*As used here, continuous, does not necessarily imply analog
monitoring. Rather, it implies a verification rate (sampled
data techniques) which is greater than the natural response
of the verified function.
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are obvious: there would be no need for onboard fault
detection. Unfortunately, nature is seldom so cooperative.
In the final analysis, the Orbiter will employ extensive,
high-confidence ground checkout which will verify the bulk
of performance and be the only verification of some devices.
A lower confidence, real-time verification will be used
for most, but not all, devices. These points will be pur-
sued below under a discussion of the criteria. First, how-
ever, some additional philosophy must be examined.
As with most large systems, the Orbiter has
functions which are dormant during part of the mission. The
question arises, "when is a failure in these functions?" If
a dormant function fails, the system, i.e., the Orbiter,
certainly has not failed since this function was not even
being used. At the time the function is finally required,
however, the system at large will not perform as required.
Assuming the unused function can even be verified, is it
worth while determining its status before it is needed?
During ground checkout the answer is obviously yes. Whether
in-flight verification is required can be tested in each case
by whether knowledge of a future event will affect current
activity on the part of the crew. When viewed in the cold
light of day, knowledge of this future event will likely not
alter current mission phase activity. If, while on-orbit it
is discovered that the landing gear will not operate, there
seems to be little use in aborting the mission. The foregoing
is not.meant to imply, however, that point verifications (as
a minimum) should not be made just prior to changing mission
phases. In the example,. it may be prudent to attempt a gear
check prior to de-orbit as this information may alter re-entry
characteristics and timing. As a general policy, all equipment
to be used in a subsequent mission phase should be verified
before commitment to that phase.
Returning to frequency of verification criteria,
if a function is very reliable (which many times equates to
a "small" function), it is questionable whether automated
verification is necessary unless the function is switched
redundant. If the chances are very remote that a function
will fail during a mission, ground checkout should be suffi-
cient as real-time verification can only add to confusion when
a decision error occurs. The same argument can be advanced
for incidental functions.
It will simply not be practical to verify some
functions on a real-time basis. This verification will have
to be relegated to ground checkout. If necessary, such
functions can, however, often be verified in-flight at various
points during the mission.
It is possible that, especially during initial
operational flights, occurrence of some functional failures
will leave the crew incapable of recovering. Such events are
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rare and are usually associated with a peculiar set of
mission executions.. In this light, it is questionable
whether automated verification will yield cost effective,
meaningful information.
Finally, when a function is used during initial
portions of the flight only, (prior to injection) there should
be little need for real-time verification. Ground checkout
should provide adequate confidence in these functions and
once their usefulness has passed, so too should concern for
their operational integrity.
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7.0 TECHNIQUES FOR SELECTING ITEMS TO BE VERIFIED
Section 6.0 identified criteria for selecting
functions or items to be verified. This section extends
those results by developing a systematic method for approach-
ing the problem. The method initially identifies candidate
IBV's without regard to implementation considerations. Once
IBV candidates are identified, implementation considerations,
enter into scrubbing the candidates to arrive at the final
selection.
Of the design factors considered in Section 6.0,
all are implementation-oriented except one; operations.
Operational considerations mark the initial thrust of 'ur
development. The criteria identified in Table 6.1 for this
design factor have recovery requirements as the common
denominator. What is the principal reason for verifying the
operational integrity of functions? Simply stated, this
information is necessary to initiate recovery actions. It
follows that:
a. The information must be at the same level
as the recovery action.
b. For Orbiter, recovery represents the level
at which the crew can do something about a
failure.
The crew can recover from failures in numerous ways.
They can modify mission objectives, modify maneuver executions
or abort. These are all procedural methods of recovering or
being able to survive, albeit at reduced capability. Func-
tional redundancy presents another recovery option. It is
a designed-in recovery from functional failure which is
effected by system reconfiguration. Redundancy, then,
represents a major, tangible recovery mechanism and is one
of the most important factors in identifying IBV's. .Section
7.1 presents anoutline procedure for identifying IBV's
based primarily on principal system redundancy structures.
Once IBV's have been identified, it will be necessary to ex-
amine how each is to be verified. It may not be necessary
to actually verify each IBV by the methods contained in
Section 5.0.' There are some additional'techniques which can
be used to determine IBV status without actually verifying
it directly.. These are known as status deduction techniques
and are discussed in Section 7.2.
7.1 IBV Identification
This section presents-a systematic approach to
identifying IBV's. All reasonable candidates are first
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identified and these are then modified as necessary when
implementation is considered.
7.1.1 Step 1--Preparation of Functional Flow Diagram
An accurate functional flow diagram of the prin-
cipal system is an imperative beginning. The detail of the
diagram should be at the level of recovery interest. All
redundancy at this level must be shown and redundancy inter-
faces will likely require detail to the piece part level.
Each case of redundancy should be supplemented by a redundancy
definition document which details exactly how the redundancy
is achieved and recovery is implemented.
7.1.2 Step 2 -Identify All Redundancy On The Diagram
Indicate, with the use of constraining lines or
boxes, the principal system recovery partition. This parti-
tion will likely be different from design partitions and.must
be done with care. Of interest are the individual elements
which are involved in recovery procedures. Such a diagram
can be more closely identified with the task analyses used
in deriving emergency procedures.
The important information to be gained from this
step is the identity of each redundant (and nonredundant)
recovery entity and their relationships to other elements.
Of the redundant elements, two distinct patterns will appear.
One will be the classic parallel redundancy wherein the
redundant elements all have the same predecessors and
followers from a functional flow sense.' That is, there will
be a functional node at both the input and output of the
redundant network where all the network elements are tied.
The second pattern which will appear is more complex. This
pattern results from relationships among elements which pre-
clude them from being configured as parallel redundancy.
Such patterns often result from functions which are used for
multiple applications in the principal system. For con-
venience, we shall call patterns of the first type redundant
sets and those of the second, redundant groups. (See Figure
7.1.2).
7.1.3 Step 3-Identify IBV Candidates
Essentially, each element identified above is a
candidate IBV. Depending on the redundancy definitions and
element relationships, some of these candidates can be
deleted or modified. The first area which should be ex-
amined are series strings of nonredundant elements. Unless
there are compelling procedural reasons to the contrary, all
such series elements can be lumped into a single IBV. Veri-
fication information on a single element in such a series
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Figure 7.1.2. Examples of Sets and Groups
chain provides no more recovery information than informa-
tion relative to the entire chain.
The redundant sets are the next area of interest.
It is possible that each element of such a set need not be
an IBV. If the elements all perform the function with equal
capability, i.e., they are all identical, and if the crew
does not need to know, specifically, which element has failed,
it may simply be necessary to determine the number of opera-
tive elements (as opposed to the status of each element).
This action would make the entire set an IBV.
Finally, the redundant groups should be examined.
These typically pose the most difficult verification problems
and it is worth additional effort to either simplify the
group by redesign or eliminate IBV's with some reduction in
crew recovery information.
7.1.4 Step 4 -- IBV Implementation Evaluation
The implementation considerations of Section 6.0
are now applied to the candidate IBV's identified thus far.
These considerations are expressed by the criteria associated
with Factors B, C and D in Table 6.1. This step identifies
whether the IBV's should be verified on a real-time basis or
a deferred-time basis. MOP's will have to be identified in
either case, the major consideration being whether the IBV
verification needs to be included in real-time CPU verifica-
tion routines or not. For example, most redundant, off-line
elements need not (and indeed cannot) be verified on a real-
time basis.
Deferred-time verification consists of two approaches:
in-flight verification and pre-flight verification. The former
is executed at scheduled points during the mission and will
have to be accommodated in the CPU. It will also require
provisions for MOP extraction and data acquisition slots. The
latter are the responsibility of Ground Checkout and no
Orbiter provisions should be necessary. IBV's which fall into
this category are those which are very reliable or which are
incidental to safety and/or mission.
This completes the identification of IBV's. We now
turn to some schemes which may be used to reduce the number of
resulting MOP's.
7.2 Status Deduction Techniques
Is it essential that each IBV have a minimum of one
MOP? Development of MOP's can be costly and one is motivated
to delete as many as possible without jeopardizing recovery
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information. Fortunately, there are two ways of reducing
the number of MOP's. One way is termed logical deduction
and the other, iterative deduction. They are each discussed
below. Using these techniques, it is possible to obtain the
status of IBV's for which no MOP's are extracted. This is
done by capitalizing on logical relationships among the IBV's,
thus the name, deduction.
Logical deduction consists of establishing algo-
rithmic relationships between the status indications of
several related IBV's. Each implementation represents a
special case and will require individual treatment. A
general example is, therefore, hard to come by, but the
principle operates as follows: if the status of A and B are
known, one can conclusively say what the status of C is with-
out ever having checked C. Candidates for logical deduction
are most likely to be found in fan-in or fan-out functional
arrangements.
Iterative deduction, as the name implies, consists
of replicating system configuration until the failed IBV is
identified. The technique only works for switched redundancy
where off-line functions can be readily switched on-line and
where sufficient time exists to allow the replications to be
effected.
The technique works as follows. Consider a chain
of switched redundant sets where each on-line element is an
IBV but only one MOP (or set of MOP's) is defined at the
end of the chain. When an on-line element fails, this con-
dition will be reflected in the end-of-chain MOP. This MOP
can obviously only reflect the state of the entire on-line
chain. Since each on-line element is an IBV, we begin
switching off-line elements into the on-line chain until the
MOP indicates the failed condition has been.corrected. At
this point we have also identified the failed IBV.
If the functions performed by the redundant chain
are not critical, this technique is quite practical and re-
sults in potentially large savings. The switching can be
initiated either manually or automatically. Note that success
of the technique depends on off-line elements which are
operative. To assure this, their status should be verified
occasionally. If the off-line elements are kept de-energized,
their warm-up time.must be considered in the time estimates
for this technique.
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8.0 SMOOTHING TECHNIQUES
The objective of this section is to survey
several smoothing techniques which are considered to be
the most likely candidates for implementation in automated
performance verification. Each technique is designed to
be implemented on a digital computer.
Recall from Section 5.0 that the purpose of
smoothing is to reduce decision error and in particular,
false alarms. To achieve this end, the process must prevent
decisions from being made on information anomalies, thus the
name smoothing. It will be shown in the discussions that, by
introducing smoothing to reduce false alarms, the likelihood
of a miss is increased. This is a characteristic of all
smoothing operations.
The smoothing techniques surveyed can be grouped
into two distinct approaches according to their operating
principles. The first approach we shall call predecision
filters and the second, post-decision filters. The operation
of the two approaches is depicted in Figure 8.0 from which
the reason for their names should be obvious. The predecision
filters discussed are recursive, digital, low-pass filters.
These are addressed in Section 8.1.
The post-decision filter, addressed in Section 8.2,
requires a bit more explanation than its counterpart above.
First, as evidenced in Figure 8.0, this class of filter oper-
ates on binary information. It effects smoothing by tallying
decisions in a given run and effectively voting on the re-
sults. The process is altered by changing the voting rules
and the size of the run considered. For example, one method
of achieving this type filter is to require N consecutive
Bad decisions at its input-before IBV status is declared
Bad. This in effect requires a unanimous vote of Bad de-
cisions before the filter declares a Bad decision. Another
method of designing the filter is on a plurality basis, i.e.,
N bad decisions required out of any M total decisions.
8.1 Predecision Filtering
There are numerous ways of achieving this class
filter since it performs in the classic role of a low-pass
filter. We shall restrict our interest to a class of filters
known as recursive smoothers which are by far the most
applicable to automated performance verification use. These
filters exhibit behavior quite similar to their analog counter-
parts. We shall describe the first order smoother in some
detail in Section 8.1.1, with higher order smoothers being
covered collectively in Section 8.1.2.
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Figure 8.0. Operation of Two Approaches to Smoothing
8.1.1 First Order (Exponential) Smoother
Figure 8.1.1-1 shows the mechanization of this
smoother. Here, T is the time between samples, X(KT) is the
value of the Kth sample input, Y(KT) is the value of the
smoother output at the Kth sample, KT is the Kth sample time
and a is the smoothing constant. The follwoing several steps
illustrate the recursion.
Y(KT) = (1-a)Y(KT-T) + a X(KT)
Y(KT+T) = (1-a)Y(KT) + a X(KT+T)
Y(KT+2T) = (1-a)Y(KT+T) + a X(KT+2T)
The general recursion relation is,
Y(KT) = a X(KT) + (1-a)Y (K-1)T
0< a<l
As may be apparent from this relation, the smoother
may be viewed as a sampled data equivalent of a single pole
filter. This technique applies geometrically related weights
to successive time samples to achieve the estimate very
similar to the impulse response of a filter. Intuitively,
the net effect is to modify the influence which each immedi-
ate sample has with respect to the output. Thus for a value
of a = 0.5, the history of the filter and the present value
of input receive equal weighting. As a is reduced beyond 0.5
more emphasis is placed on the past history of the input. The
weights applied to the individual samples are,
a (l-a)m
where m represents the sample taken m periods ago. Large
values of a will yield a responsive smoother and small values,
a more stable smoother.
We should like to be able to rate the smoothing
performance of the filter for purposes of selecting a and for
purposes of comparing filter alternatives. Expressed in such
a measure is the false alarm immunity of the smoother. The
most general method of achieving this measure is to compare
the variance of the smoother output to the variance of .its
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Figure 8.1.1-1. Mechanization Of A First Order
Recursive Smoother
input. For, the purpose of the smoother is nothing more
than to reduce input variance., The output, Y(KT), variance
is expressed
. 2 a 2
e. s2-a
where a2 is the variance of the filter estimate, i.e., its
output, eand as is the variance of the input sample. The
ratio of these two variances is the measure we seek and is
plotted in Figure 8.1.1-2. It should be noted that the ex-
pression of output variance above makes two assumptions.
* Values from the random process causing
the variance will be uncorrelated from
sample to sample.
* The time between samples, T, is constant.
If either of these assumptions does not hold, the output
variance will be greater than that indicated by the operation.
A second measure of smoother performance is its
step response. This expresses its immunity to misses. The
step response is expressed as the number of sample periods
required to reach 90% of the final value. This relation is
also plotted in Figure 8.1.1-2. It should be noted that the
step response represents the worst case response of the
smoother. All other inputs will exhibit a response less than
the step response. A smoother can be designed graphically
from Figure 8.1.1-2 by trading off false alarm immunity and
miss immunity in the selection of a.
In terms of complexity, the first order smoother is
simple to implement. It requires but a single data storage
location, the value of Y(KT), and a simple arithmetic program.
8.1.2 Higher Order Recursive Smoothers
Just as higher order analog filters (increased
number of.poles) are used to achieve equivalent response with
a smaller bandpass, higher order smoothing may be used to
accomplish the same end. In general, n-order smoothing is
realizable but interest here will be limited to no greater.
than third order.
Second order smoothing essentially imbeds the first
order process in an identical but overlying process. Opera-
tionally, second order smoothing determines the first order
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Figure 8.1.1-2. Performance Characteristics of a
First Order (Exponential) Smoother
estimate and uses this estimate (as opposed to the observed
value) to update the second order estimate. Then,
Y2 (KT) = aY(KT) + (1-a)[Y 2 (K-1)T]
where Y,(KT) is the second order estimate at time KT (or
period K) and Y(KT) is the first order estimate. This tech-
nique will require two locations in memory since both Y2 (KT)
and Y(KT) must be preserved for the next period. (Recall that
a must either be stored explicitly or entered as a constant
in the program.)
Third order smoothing continues the trend set by.
second order and operates on the second order estimate,
Y3 (KT) aY 2 (KT).+ (l-a)Y, [(K-1)T]
As might be expected, third order smoothing requires three
memory locations.
A comparison should be made between the three
smoothing techniques with regard to response. The basis for
comparison is response to a step input. If al is the smoothing
constant for first order smoothing, a2 second order smoothing
etc., an equivalency is shown in Figure 8.1.2. From this
figure, it can be seen that, for an equivalent response.to a
step input, a second order smoother would require an a of 0.37
and a first order smoother an a of 0.6. These results can be
related to the response plot of the first order smoother in
Figure 8.1.1-2. For .a = 0.6, a first order smoother would
reach 90% of its final value in two steps. A second order
smoother would achieve the same result with an a = 0.37.
While the variance curve for second order smoothing is not
shown, it will exhibit the same.trend as that shown for first
order. It is obvious that a reduction in estimate variance
(with respect to the variance of the observed signal) is
achieved.
Some further characteristics are summarized in
Table 8.1.2. The impulse response is valuable for determining
rejection of spikes and providing comparisons with comparable
analog filters. The transfer function will afford Z-plane
analysis.
8.2 Post-decision Filtering
This filtering operates by combining successive
status decisions to generate an alarm state. Such combining
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Table 8.1.2. Some Characteristics Of The
First Three Orders Of Recursive Smoothing
ORDER OF IMPULSE TRANSFER REQ'D NO. .OF
SMOOTHER RESPONSE FUNCTION STORED DATA WORDS
t ctFirst (1-)t 1-(1-)z 1
Second a 2 (t+1)(-a)t 2
[ 1-(1-a) z 2
Third 3 (t+l)(t+2) (1-a)t 32 [1-(1-ctz]3
1.0
0.9
0.8
e 1
0.7
0.6 ,_o,
ae
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
a 86062-9
Figure 8.1.2. Equivalency of Smoothing Constants for Three
Orders of Recursive Smoothing
serves the same function as a classical filter, that is,
it reduces the potential data rate to remove the effects of
rapidly fluctuating interference. Also, by combining N
decisions before an alarm is generated, the alarm is delayed
by at least N sample periods. This is a significant con-
trast to the predecision filters where the step response
represented the worst case response. Here, step response
represents the best possible response under any conditions.
Except for the contrast in step response, post-
decision filtering strives to accomplish the same things as
predecision filtering. It offers potential advantages in
simplicity of implementation,particularly where several
variables are employed in making the decision. The following
paragraphs will discuss and compare the performance capa-
bilities of several implementations ofpost-decision filters.
So that the various implementations may be compared, Section
8.2.1 develops a performance criterion. Section 8.2.2
through 8.2.4 describe three implementations of post-decision
filters.
8.2.1 Post-decision Performance Criterion
There are basically two areas for performance com-
parison. The first has to do with implementation of the
filter. Since the filtering is a software operation this
reduces to determination of CPU computing power and storage
requirements for the various filtering techniques.
The second area of comparison is functional. How
much improvement is given by the filter? There is a wide
range of performance comparison possibilities and unless a
common measure can be achieved for the general case, it will
be quite difficult to trade filter implementations. For this
reason a single parameter comparison that allows a quanti-
tative discussion of performance has been selected. This
criterion is the number of samples from an initial state
until an alarm has occurred with 50% probability. The
criterion assumes identical and independent statistics on
each decision. It is a function only of the input proba-
bility of an error indication and the filter implementation.
If the filter acts on discrete batches of samples
and makes an alarm decision, the probability of at least one
alarm after I batches is one minus the probability that no
alarms have occurred.
PaI = I-(l-Pa)I
where P is the probability of an alarm on any batch. Fora
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P of 0.5, the number of batches for 0.5 probability of
aI
detection is
ln 0.5
ln(l-Pa
We define P as the probability that a single de-
cision sample (input o the filter) is an error or out-limit
indication. Note that for the case of N equal unity, i.e.,
no filter, Pa is identically Pe.
The performance of each implementation discussed
in the following sections will be assessed based on Pe and
the average number of input samples (average length of a run)
until a 0.5 probability of alarm is reached. We shall call
this number of samples N s.
8.2.2 Up/Down Counter
This filter is a simple up/down counter which in-
creases on an error decision and decreases on no-error decision.
If it reaches a level N, an alarm is produced. In general, a
no-error decision will decrease the count by K and an error
decision will increase the count by J. The count is not
allowed to go negative.
The software requirement for each decision is 2
comparisons and an increment or an initialization.
Performance can be determined by assigning each
count of the counter a state and looking at state transition
probabilities from sample to sample. The probability of
being at count i on decision n is
K
P = (1-P e ) C P
on e 1 1,n-11=0
P =P (1-P), l<i<Ji,n i+K,n-i e -
Pin = P. i+K (1-P) + P Pe' J< i < N-K-1in i+K,n-1 e i-J,n-1 e.
P = P P ,N-K < i < Ni,n i-J,n-1 e
N,n N-J,n-1 Pe N,n-1
The performance of this filter is shown in Figure
8.2.2 for J=K=l and N=1,4,8. The curve for N=l represents
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the alarm probability with no filter. Note that with no
filter and Pe = 0.1, the chances are 50-50 of getting an
alarm in just nine samples.
The minimum response time for each filter is the
value of N.
8.2.3 M Out of N Counter
A flow diagram for this filter is shown in Figure
8.2.3-1. N decisions are counted. If there are M or more
error decisions, the error alarm is generated. The process
requires 1 increment and 2 comparisons for a no error
decision and an additional increment and comparison if an
error decision is made. Since this worst case should be
included in a budget, implementation requires 2 increments
and 3 comparisons.
Note that the technique described here takes a
block of N samples and makes a decision. A technique re-
quiring M out of the last N decisions could also be imple-
mented but requires considerable more processing and memory
of the last N decisions.
The probability of their being M or more error de-
cisions in N samples is
N N-i
P = N Pi (1-P )N-
a i=M i(N-i)' e e
The number of samples is NI plus, on the average, N/2 at
initialization from a previous sequence.
The performance of this filter is plotted in Figure
8.2.3-2 for four combinations of N and M. Since this filter
is operating on batches, its step response is not necessarily
N. It is reasonable to assume that a step input will occur
(on the average) in the middle of a batch. The step response
is then,
M ,1 < M < N/2
M+N/2, N/2 < M < N
Comparing these results to those of the up/down
counter, it is seen that the up/down counter has a smaller
step response for any given value of the performance criterion,
Ns and N.
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8.2.4 Run of N Filter
In the limit of the M out of N decisions there is
the N out of N case. This is given special treatment here
because its implementation can be easily carried out on the
last N instead of a block of N giving a faster response time.
The case is also a special case of the up/down counter where
J is 1 and K is equal to N.
The filter operates by counting consecutive error
decisions. An alarm is sounded when N conseuctive error
decisions are counted. Any single non-error decision which
occurs before N is reached will cause the count to be reset
to zero. The filter requires 1 comparison and an initializa-
tion if no error is indicated and 2 comparisons and an
increment if an error is indicated so that implementation
for worst case computations is identical.to the up/down
counter.
The probability of the first run of N errors
occurring on sample n is the probability that no run has
occurred by sample n-N-1 followed by a non-error decision,
followed by N consecutive error indications. This can be
formulated as
/ n-N-1
PN(1Pe)n-N-1 1- Pn e e Pi=0
where the last two factors account for the occurrence of no
run. We seek that value of n for which Pn = 0.5.
The performance of this filter is plotted in Figure
8.2.4 for N=4,8. It can be seen that the false alarm immunity
for this filter is greater than either of the others consider-
ed. Note also, that for very small values of P^ there is
little difference between the performance of this filter and
the up/down counter.
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9.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This volume has developed a methodology fordesigning automated performance verification and providedtechniques and concepts in support of that methodology.
A design procedure has been advanced as well as a formal
structure for the verification process. Emphasis has been
placed on verifying functions while the function is performingits operational role.
A procedure for selecting items to be verified as
well as a set of criteria for determining functions for which
verification is most advantageous have been presented. A set
of techniques for verifying performance and establishing mea-
sures of performance are described along with their implemen-
tation considerations. Finally, a survey of smoothing or false
alarm avoidance techniques is presented. The techniques havebeen supported by design aids and performance characteristics.
The methodology has been applied to an example using
the Orbiter Hydraulics System.
It was concluded that operations and.redundancy were
the two most significant factors influencing the selection ofitems for which status must be determined. Whether an item
should be verified in real- or deferred-time is primarily
determined by whether:
* it is on-line or off-line
* it is very reliable
* real-time verification is warranted from
the standpoint.of cost, confidence in the
results, ability of the crew to manually
verify operation
It was pointed out that attempts to reduce. false
alarms always increase the delay to fault notification. Useof a predecision smoother guarantees a maximum value to this
delay, whereas post-decision cannot guarantee such a maximum.
In the discussion of verification techniques it was
noted that achieving performance verification on a real-timebasis presents a greater challenge than designing a functionallab or bench test. The development and extraction of meaning-
ful measures of performance is the key to successful automatedperformance verification. The designer of the item being
verified must play a significant role in establishing these
measures. It is quite likely that remote performance mea-
sure processing, to include analog implementations, will be
required for digital computer versions of automated performance
verification.
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APPENDIX A
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT DESIGN EXAMPLE FOR
SHUTTLE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Al.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate
the application of the developed performance verification
concepts to a typical subsystem of the Orbiter. The Hydraulic
System was chosen based on its ease of definition which, on
the other hand, demonstrates some of the complex concepts in-
volved in the implementation of system performance verifica-
tion. This appendix includes a brief description of the
Orbiter Hydraulic System including its modes of operation
over the mission phases. This discussion is followed by a
detailed discussion of a performance verification design for
the Hydraulic System in Section A3.0. Relating these results
to the Orbiter System Management Function under development
at this writing, the design described herein reflects an.
implementation of Orbiter functional path fault detection.
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A2.0 ORBITER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The purpose of this section is to describe the
Hydraulic System as applied to the performance verification
process. The Orbiter Hydraulic System is used to provide
hydraulic power during the boost, re-entry, and landing
phases of flight. Redundancy is provided in the Hydraulic
System by use of three (3) independent hydraulic subsystems.
Hydraulic power is provided to the appropriate orbiter
functions through automatic switching valves that switch to
alternate hydraulic systems in the event of failure of the
primary Hydraulic System. (For the purposes of this analysis,
the three hydraulic systems which comprise the hydraulic
power source for Orbiter will be referred to as hydraulic
systems and not as hydraulic subsystems. This should not be
confused with the total hydraulic system which is made up of the
the three hydraulic systems.)
Table A2-1 presents the shuttle system functions
involving the hydraulic systems. Hydraulic power is required
during boost and from re-entry through landing at which time
full hydraulic pressure is required. The remaining portion of
the mission (except during re-entry checkout) involves essen-
tially housekeeping functions for the Hydraulic System during
which time the hydraulic fluid is circulated periodically
through the system to maintain the fluid to within its operating
temperature range.
The detailed description of the Hydraulic System
performance and components are found in Reference 1 and 2.
The Hydraulic Power System incorporates functional
redundancy provisions to ensure that operation of hydraulic-
driven components can continue after specified failure. With
the exception of nosewheel steering and strut actuators, re-
dundancy is obtained by switching valves located at the
actuators which provide the capability to automatically select
the hydraulic system supplying hydraulic power to that actuator
in the event of a pressure drop in the currently used hydraulic
system.* This pressure drop is sensed at the switch valve.
Each switch valve is initialized to supply hydraulic pressure
by one hydraulic system which is designated as the active sys-
tem. The other systems are connected to the actuators through
the switching valve and are designated Standby 1 (Sl) or
Standby 2 (S2) systems.. In the event of a failure of the
Active (A) System, the switching valve automatically switches
over to the Sl system. In the event thatsystem (Sl) fails,
changeover to the S2 system is automatic.
*The hydraulic components in the subsystems accommodating
nosewheel steering and strut actuators cannot switch to
alternate hydraulic power sources. They remain fixed to one
hydraulic system.
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Table A2-l. O hiter Hydraulic System Mission Phase Modes
Mission Phase Futiontion Hydraulic System Function
Boost TVC controls for main engine " Hydraulic Power
Fuel control for main engine
On-Orbit Maintenance of fluid temperature Circulate fluid and temper-
ature control
Re-entry checkout Hydraulic power
De-Orbit/Re-Entry Flight Control Hydraulic power
Elevons
Body Flap
Speed Brake/Rudder
Landing/Deceleration Landing gear/brakes Hydraulic power
Strut Actuators
Uplocks
Brakes
Nosewheel Steering
Fluid cooling Cool fluid
System checkout Hydraulic power
Table A2-2 presents the functions and the corre-
sponding hydraulic systems with designations as Active (A),
Standby 1 (Sl) or Standby 2 (S2). It is observed that two
functions, the body flap and speed brake/rudder employ all 3
hydraulic systems as active hydraulic power sources. This is
accomplished by each system driving a motor which is mechani-
cally summed through a differential to drive the aerodynamic
surfaces. The system is designed such that 50% power is
utilized for each system to achieve the maximum actuator
rate. Therefore, loss of one system can be totally compen-
sated for by the other two. Loss of two systems would re-
quire application of the priority control system in which the
aero surfaces are rate-limited after 2 hydraulic system
failures. Similarly, after touchdown, two active hydraulic
systems are active for braking.
During the on-orbit phase of flight, the main
function of the hydraulic system is to remain operable. Elec-
trically driven circulation pumps move hydraulic fluid through
the system and (as temperature demands) a fluid heater to
maintain the fluid temperature to within its operating ranges.
Each pump is operated for 20 minutes on the hour and, in this
manner, all 3 pumps may be run 1/3 of the time each hour,
cycling one to another. This operation reduces electrical
power drain.
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Table A2-2. Assignment of Hydraulic Systems To
Orbiter Functions
Function System 1 System 2 System 3
TVC, Main Engines
Control Actuators
Engine 1 Yaw A S2 S1
Engine 1 Pitch A S1 S2
Engine 2 Yaw S2 A S1
Engine 2 Pitch S1 A S2
Engine 3 Yaw S2 S1 A
Engine 3 Pitch S1 S2 A
Main Engine Control
#1 Controls S1 A
#2 Controls - Si A
#3 Controls Sl - A
Flight Controls
Elevons Rt Outbd A S1 S2
Rt Inbd Sl S2 A
Lt Outbd S2 S1 A
Lt Inbd S1 A S2
Body Flap Motor Pwr A A A
Speed Brake/ Motor Pwr A A A
Rudder
Logic S2 Sl A
Deceleration & Landing
Strut Actuators A
Uplocks S2 A S1
Brakes Rt Outbd A A Sl1
Rt Inbd A A S1
Lt Outbd A A S1
Lt Inbd A A Sl
Nosewheel Steering A
During on-orbit & landing -circ. pump for heating or
cooling fluid.
A3.0 PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION DESIGN DEVELOPMENT
System performance verification requires an
organized and systematic approach to the design of an effi-
cient performance verification system. Because of the
complexity of a Shuttle system, the objective is to minimize
the amount of data reported to the crew by the performance
monitor and yet to still maintain a high degree of capability
in verifying performance of the subsystem. Stated in terms
of the System Management problem, reliable performance data
should be reported at the level for which the crew is capable
of taking action. This, then, equates to reporting Orbiter
faults to the functional path level. As pointed out in the
body of this volume, by definition of items to be verified
(IBV's) and by choice of appropriate measures of performance
(MOP's) of each, the performance verification system is
established. As the analysis progresses, it should become
obvious that an IBV and a functional path (in Orbiter design
terminology) are one and the same.
One of the key elements in the performance verifi-
cation function is the definition of the system bounds to
ensure that the items being verified (IBV's) and measures of
performance (MOP's) are truly a measure of performance (and
verification) of the system and not of another system located
functionally upstream (input) or downstream (after output) of
the system in question. As a result, great care was taken to
define the bounds of the hydraulic system.
This section includes a discussion of the IBV
selection for this problem, their bounds and limits; a de-
scription of the performance verification system requirements,
the definition of measures of performance and a discussion
of the performance verification system decision rules.
A3.1 Identification of IBV's
As discussed earlier, one of the most important
parts of the performance verification process is the proper
definition of the items to be verified. Care must be taken
to ensure that the IBV presents a level consistent with pro-
viding a good indication of level of performance without
providing redundant information.
Three IBV's are defined in the hydraulic system.
They are the three independent hydraulic systems used to
furnish hydraulic power to the entire Orbiter vehicle. These
are chosen because they represent the smallest subdivision
of the hydraulic power system that can fail and directly re-
late to failure of a system which limits hydraulic power
capability (or at least redundancy). Failure of any component
of the hydraulic system would result in an effective failure
of the hydraulic system, and therefore, would provide useless
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information since no means of repair have been provided.
For example, failure of the APU or.main pump results in loss
of hydraulic pressureand, therefore, loss of the hydraulic
system,
Figure A3.1 shows the Hydraulic System Functional
Flow Diagram (3 included in the Hydraulic Power System) for
the Orbiter System. The bounds of the defined IBV are indi-
cated. As illustrated, included in the IBV are all the
elements for power generation (APU, Automatic Pressure Con-
trol, main pump with electric depressurization valve for
start), fluid distribution (lines and part of the switching
valves) and fluid property .maintenance (filter, heater,
cooler, circulation pump). The bounds of the IBV cross the
input on-off signals for the pumps and APU and the lines
going to the actuators and motors. The switching valves (to
switch to alternate subsystems in the event of loss of power
on one subsystem) are partially included within the bounds
of the IBV since they are used in the power distribution
function but their automatic selection capability is not part
of the hydraulic system function. The bounds cut the lines
going to the actuator and motors because a failure in that
line would disable the actuator but not the Hydraulic System
itself. The one exception to this is the development of a
leak in the actuator line. If a leak develops in the control
valve, actuator, or in the lines to the actuator, it may lead
to failure in the system due to loss of hydraulic fluid.
This type of failure could be catastrophic since, unless
isolated, that failure would first cause the primary Hydraulic
System to fail; the switch valve would then switch to the
first standby and proceed to fail it until all three hydraulic
systems were drained of hydraulic fluid.
It should be noted that the pump pressure regulator
package has been included as part of the IBV. This is neces-
sary since its performance is essential to IBV operation.
This is a good example of the differences that can occur be-
tween performance verification partitions and subsystem design
partitions.
The choice of the three IBV's as the three indepen-
dent hydraulic'systems making up the total hydraulic power
system on the Orbiter is consistent with the requirements that
the IBV be as large as the significance or consequence of
failure. IBV's at a level lower than that would have the same
impact as this and would require more IBV reporting. Further-
more, once,a failure is indicated on this IBV, the System
Management' (SM) system can follow with a review of component
status to isolate a failure and/or to assess the degree of
failure.
Since the distribution of power in the hydraulic
system is performed automatically from one system to another
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Figure A3.1. Hydraulic System Functional Flow Diagram
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when a switch valve senses loss of pressure, the Shuttle
crew does not need to take any direct action in the event of
a single IBV failure (except possibly to turn off that hy-
draulic system). However, the crew must be aware of loss ofthe system since it limits the total hydraulic system capa-
bility from a redundancy standpoint as well as, in the case
of two hydraulic system failures, providing less hydraulic
power for the body flap and speed brake/rudder during aero-dynamic control. In short, Oribter dynamics change with-the
number of failed hydraulic systems and the crew will likely
alter decisions based on hydraulic system status information.
A3.2 Identification of the Performance Verification
Requirements
Once the IBV's have been established, performance
requirements on the performance verification system must be
defined. Typically, such requirements include the following:
* Response time requirements for the Performance
System -timeliness requirements for failure
data on the IBV.
* Accuracy and confidence requirements - i.e.,
what is the tolerance for false alarm or misses?
* Definition of different modes of operation of
the IBV and how the Performance Verification
System responds to those differing modes.
* Frequency for verification of the IBV function
or subsystem.
* Performance criteria on which to base measure-
ment of operational integrity--the relationship
of the IBV output to the required performance
indications or the relation of the rationale of
the IBV performance with respect to means of
identifying its performance.
/ In short, specifications for the design of the
rperformance verification system are being defined and related
co system performance. The important point here is that the
/IBV performance requirements and use dictates the require-
ments for the 'performance verification system design.
The performance verification system requirements
are heavily .related to the significance of the IBV and the
accuracy and timeliness requirement for reporting the status
of that IBV. It must be adaptive to accommodate the require-
ments during the different mission phases.
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There are two distinct modes of hydraulic system
operation during a Shuttle mission. One is when it is
operating to provide full hydraulic power during the boost,
re-entry checkout (on-orbit), and during re-entry through
landing phase of flight. The second mode is the on-orbit mode
where the hydraulics are not being used and the only function
is the maintenance of hydraulic fluid temperature. During
the first mode of operation, the performance verification
system needs to report continuously, the status of the hydrau-
lic system. However, during the second mode, the system is
not in use and therefore cannot be truly tested for failure.
Therefore, during the second mode of operation (on-orbit) no
performance verification data is required. However, the
measurements associated with the circulation system and fluid
temperature maintenance should be available to the Caution
and Warning system so that if the temperature gets too cold
and/or too hot, and/or the fluid level in the reservoir gets
too low, a warning would be signaled. (This is not a function
of fault detection/performance verification).
The hydraulic system, with its redundancy and asso-
ciated GN&C automatic switching capability, is somewhat for-
giving in the area of response time and accuracy of performance
verification reporting. Therefore, a response time (although
not known at this time) should be on the order of a few seconds
to inform the crew of failure of the particular hydraulic sys-
tems. Similarly, with only one failure, the accuracy of the
data can be suspect, however, when another hydraulic system
(IBV) fails, the burden may be placed on the crew to verify
the accuracy of the performance verification system, at which
time alternate sensors and subsystem status can be monitored.
How the status of redundant hydraulic systems is
reported could be a simple tally of the number of operative
systems (IBV's), e.g., 2 of 3 are operative. Since all are
identical, this approach seems attractive due to a large
amount of information contained in the single statement. Un-
fortunately, the effects of IBV failures are not identical.
As indicated in Section A2.0, the loss of Hydraulic System 1
results in a degraded performance not realized by loss of
System 2 or 3 (i.e., loss of N/W steering and gear actuators).
Thus, it will be necessary to display the status of each IBV.
The performance criterion for the hydraulic system
is essentially to provide hydraulic power (pressure) during
its operating mode (and on-orbit checkout). During the on-
orbit mode, there is no real performance output, therefore, no
performance criteria is indicated except those inputs to the
Caution and Warning system whose function is to annunciate
potential problems.
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A3.3 Identifying Measures of Performance
The primary function of the hydraulic system is to
provide hydraulic pressure for use by numerous actuators on
the Orbiter System. Therefore, the hydraulic pressure is the
most important measure of performance. (This is particularly
true since the hydraulic pump is pressure regulated.) Two
other measures of performance are the level of the fluid in
the reservoir and temperature of the hydraulic fluid. These
two measures provide indication of the performance status of
the system. The reservoir fluid level is an indication of
system leaks and of impending loss of pressure resulting from
loss of fluid whereas the fluid temperature is important to
ensure proper operation of the hydraulic system.
All three measures of performance:
Pressure
Fluid Level in the Reservoir
Fluid Temperature
satisfy the guidelines and are characterized as follows:
Quantifiable
Identifiable Range of Limit
Representative of the Function Being Performed
Responsive and Not Volatile
The only measure of performance which is volatile is the
pressure MOP. Although the system is designed to respond very
quickly to provide a constant pressure during actuator dynamic
operation, the pressure transient could report a failure for
a moment or two during that transient period. This will be
discussed in more detail in the next section.
A3.4 Identifying Decision Rules
At this point in the development of the performance
verification, the ground work has been established by the
identification of system performance requirements, identifi-
cation of IBV's which are indicative of system performance,
definition of performance verification requirements for the.
system, and definition of the measures of performance (MOP's)
for each IBV (in this case, each of the IBV's are identical).
The purpose of this section is to develop the rules for de-
fining system status for the IBV's utilizing the MOP's
identified above.
Hydraulic pressure is the first MOP defined for the
hydraulic system. During use of the hydraulic system, i.e.,
dynamic flight, the pressure of approximately 3000 psi must
be maintained. If the pressure departs appreciably from this
valve, then a fault is reported. The high and low pressure
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bounds for the ALT mission have been described to be 2850
psia to 3050 psia (Ref. 1). Consideration must be given to
two things here:
1) What is the variation in hydraulic pressure
when all the actuators and motors are being
used?
2) What is the range of pressure required for
nominal system performance?
It is understood that the hydraulic pump is controlled to
provide constant pressure throughout the mission and that
under minimal hydraulic power usage, these limits will not be
exceeded.
However, if a large variation in pressure were
experienced during maximum power usage and if the power re-
quirement variation is smaller than that experienced during the
transient, a provision to account for the transient in the per-
formance verification system must be provided. This is ex-
emplified in Figure A3.4. One observes that during the
transient condition, the pressure drops below the pressure
envelope, however, for only a short period of time. This would
report a fault condition which, for an instant may be true due
to pressure being below the required threshold; however, as far
as the performance of the Hydraulic system is concerned, every-
thing would be operating according to specification. In this
area, the MOP should be defined to accommodate the transient
low pressure condition.* A possibility is to restate the MOP
in terms of RMS pressure or pressure averaged of a running,
say, 100 msec window. This quantity would then'be tested
against the stated bounds. This concept can be expanded to
provide a means of reducing the pressure fault limits for the
hydraulic system if the transient conditions are accounted for.
The second measure of performance is the level of
fluid in the reservoir as an indication of nominal performance
of the system. There is some question as to the role reservoir
fluid level plays in the Performance Verification system. It
has a tendency to be related to caution and warning in re-
porting a low fluid level. The measure may not be required.
It has been identified to compensate for rapid pressure fluc-
tuations resulting from pump cavitation when fluid is low. The
average pressure MOP could take care of this detection also.
*This MOP restatement should not be confused with false alarm
avoidance or smoothing. A different MOP is being defined and
calculated based on IBV performance. False alarm avoidance
is a separate problem.
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The third measure of performance is fluid temper-
ature in the system. The fault detection or performance
verification for this MOP presents a failure if the temper-
ature of the fluid falls out of the design temperature bounds
which are (TBD) to 250 0 F. The MOP has been defined to
accommodate hydraulic dynamic variations due to variations in
viscosity. It too, may not be necessary if the pressure MOP
is properly defined.
In summary, the criterion for reporting failure on
the Hydraulic System during power operation include the three
measures of performance:
Pressure - Within specific pressure limits
with provisions in the perform-
ance verification to account for
the transient conditions.
Reservoir Fluid - Report failure when it drops
Level below 5% - consideration should
be given to replacing this MOP
with a more conclusive pressure
MOP.
Fluid Temperature - Indicating a failure mode in
the fluid if the temperature
of the fluid exceeds the bounds
of +250OF and -(TBD)OF. Con-
sideration should be given to
replacing this MOP with a more
conclusive pressure MOP.
No performance verification is employed in the on-
orbit mission phase.
REFERENCES:
1. "Orbiter 101 Subsystem Simulation Requirements for
Performance Monitor Functional Simulator, Hydraulics,"
L.E.C., No. LEC-4130, Aug. 1974.
2. "Orbiter 101 Subsystem Simulation Requirements for
Performance Monitor Functional Simulator, Landing and
Deceleration," L.E.C., No. LEC-4404, Sept. 1974.
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APPENDIX B
MOP EXTRACTION TECHNIQUES
Bl.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to provide descrip-
tions and some discussion of several typical MOP Extraction
Techniques. These techniques, along with numerical and
analog descriptions of their operation, are summarized in
Table B1.0. As may be seen, they are partitioned into broad
classes on the basis of number of IBV's involved and source
of the information used in MOP calculations. These classes
are defined in Figure B1.0. In all cases, the assumption is
that the information used in the calculations is provided as
a time series of numbers representing the IBV input or output
signal, as the case may be.
Throughout this appendix {X} denotes the set of
numbers derived directly from the IBV. {Y} denotes the set
of determined MOP's for the IBV.
Altogether ten MOP techniques are covered. Of these,
five are MOP Class 1, two are MOP Class 2, and three are MOP
Class 3.
Each of the ten techniques is described and discussed
below. Generally, the technique name denotes a whole collec-
tion of more specific techniques. For example, "spectral
analysis" denotes many techniques which share the character-
istic frequency domain measures obtained from a time series;
but the number of practical implementations of the Discrete
Fourier Transform is large,and the selection of an optimal
technique depends strongly on both the specific time series
data and other implementation constraints (e.g., computer run
time, memory size, and word size restrictions).
B-1
TABLE -- SON\E- TY'IC-AL- -MAOP VRA 5ZKTION VALLJ.S-
NU.MBER Su.6CJ'S LAA ~ ~ TEOTT~~ OF GaENERAL !-ASE (DlIcRGETE VE SIQt TYPLKNLE Vi$Jf
y (+I- K
3E)_QUI NTIAL VALUE CH-EOK K= CONSTANTO~3~L.lCtLV
VALU ~~~ ~ CLE CNc T z IJ-AC.+LOVX 4or w6cl 4 1\ le. X K
Ip: Y_ Iadpn y-6_cr6 tw K 0-0ONSTA NT
dL=I1orO0 Y=' dt~cL .. octnil ed2%
3 OING lYaiki 4 I Ins Orie -Bool en dcuc~on o~- r a-i5b+
SFAPTlTtI\L ANALYSIS 1y.j1~k Some Y(~i~~~ fL. oyvfUid')K
___ I II -QONSTANT
ANALYSIS ~~~- -so rve.' nr V-;o \ 0tV d;escc~p rie,
Fotirierfj -fo~~ry K,,l Ki = CONSTA T
SINVG SE _T4LANSFI~A W(+)= -i nj d y a
0~~i~jxsV&6V '~F"'~ Noese -rans4~-fkoY*L
A c\WT(+)= U~r 4  uk tfCIX'= rl9V oLxp~s, '?5TBV inpts
8 MA _~E TWO3 &zYt)Y()
____ __ 
XW1_____ L _
ZV~I~ 1  {necr
ANALYSIS G- .2 c"~ o o~v
2~~~O$5POWER~~~c pFCT'PLZ{k~)~GAS~I eS~la~4.
cokrnce. -fincor~ c=it
Xf i U 'c 4  ~
lylHUI ki -
-'A, AEI ODLTFIAME ORIGTNAL AEI
FOLD)OlUT FWAE POOR~ QflTY1FPO
CLASS # DEFINITION
1 MOP calculations are based
on information regarding the
output(s) of a single IBV
2 MOP calculations are based
on information regarding
both the input(s) and the
output(s) of a single IBV
3 MOP calculations are based
on information regarding
the outputs of multiple (two
or more) similar IBV's,
which share the same inputs
Figure B1.0. Classes of MOP Extraction Techniques
B2.0 CLASS 1 MOP'S
All Class 1 techniques have in common the fact
that only extracted numbers from the output(s) of a single
IBV are used for the MOP calculation. Thus only conditional
status can be determined directly from these MOP's since
nothing is known regarding IBV input status at decision
time ("conditional" means "conditional on the state of the
input").
B2.1 Sequential Value Check Techniques
As shown in Table B1.0, the general form for this
subclass of techniques is
Yilm = f(lXi.klI)
where f describes some time-ordered function of the IBV data.
If the time series of X is described by Xi this function
could be Y = Xn - Xn-_
. 
Or, Y = max {Xn,Xn-l}, Y = Xn - Xn-_1
K. These techniques are quite similar to nonsequential value
checks except that here, order of the samples is considered
to be important. An example of a sequential value check
technique is the case where the derivative of the IBV output
signal is required as a measure of performance. Numerically,
this amounts to determining the difference between two
successive samples. This particular example is illustrated
in Table B1.0.
B2.2 Non-Sequential Value Check Techniques
These techniques are similar to those above, except
that f is constrained to be a function for which the value
is independent of the order of the IXijkI. In its simplest
form, this technique may involve the calculations of a MOP
based solely on the most recent value of the sequence lXijkl'
and the MOP may be the difference between the value of Xijk
and some fixed reference value. This simple MOP is quite
appropriate for many verification purposes; for example, it is
useful in verifying the correctness of the sampled output
voltage of a power supply.
B2.3 Coding Techniques
Coding techniques are generally applicable only
when output signals from the IBV are in digital form. A typical
example of the use of coding for performance verification is
the use of a parity check in the output of a core memory in a
computer system. In this case, the IBV is the core memory, and
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incorrect parity is the X.. The MOP (Y) is developed from
the Xi on the basis of numiber of parity errors committed
either consecutively or over some period of time.* A
different form of the coding technique is also commonly
used to verify the correct operation of magnetic tape sub-
systems of a computer system, and the technique has been
proposed for verification of the correct operation of the
arithmetic unit in computer systems.
In a typical example of the use of a coding tech-
nique, the extracted numbers will be of the form
Xijk = dl, d2 , d2 , .... dn
where di is a binary digit (0 or 1). Some of the digits (di)
contain redundant information, which is used to allow de-
tection of certain types of errors in the Xiik. The detection
system can be simple, requiring only the com utation of the
Boolean function
X = d + d + .... + dn
and Y = E(N consecutive Xi)
as a MOP. In this case, if Y = N then the conditional status
of the IBV is "bad"; otherwise it is "good."
In the magnetic tape application mentioned earlier,
Boolean computations are commonly done on rows and columns
of binary arrays formed from sequences of ,Xijk  and the
associated codes are often called block check codes.
In general there are many different types of codes,
some capable of detecting and possibly correcting mulitple
bit errors. They are all characterized by the fact that
redundant bits are added to non-redundant bits in a controlled
manner; thus certain types of subsequent distortions of the
entire number (redundant plus nonredundant bits) due to IBV
failures, communications noise, or any other cause, can be
detected or possibly corrected. The detection and correction
of errors is generally done independent of the value of the
number before redundancy was added, and this is a unique
and often desirable feature of the coding technique.
*Recall that MOP's are used as failure indicators, not error
indicators. The fact that a parity error has occurred does
not necessarily mean that a failure has occurred. Errors
must be translated into failures.
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B2.4 Statistical Analysis Techniques
The statistical analysis MOP techniques can be
described as
Yilml = f(IXijkI)
where f is some statistical function of the extracted
numbers such as mean value, variance, RMS, etc. Computation
of such functions is routine for a general purpose digital
computer, and many algorithms are known and used for the
more common functions. Thus there are no conceptual imple-
mentation difficulties associated with the technique;
whether or not it is suitable depends mainly on whether or
not the IBV can be well characterized by statistical MOP's
and on the processor memory and time requirements associated
with its implementation.
B2.5 Spectral Analysis Techniques
These techniques involve the extraction of
frequency information from the IBV, usually in terms of
energy bands. For example, the MOP might be the energy con-
tent of a given band or the energy ratio of the fundamental
to the third harmonic. It is usually much easier to do the
frequency/energy determination with lumped constant circuits
which are part of signal conditioning rather than digital
equivalents. These equivalents, however, can certainly be
used.
For digital computer implementation, we are assuming
that IBV output signals are represented as number sequences,
where the sequences typically represent sample values of a
time-continuous signal. There are many algorithms available
for converting a time signal identified by such numbers into
its frequency domain representation; however, nearly all of
them require that the numbers represent values of the sampled
signal taken at equal intervals of time. Furthermore, care
must be taken to make the sampling interval be sufficiently
small to ensure capture of all significant information in
the IBV output signal. The maximum permissible size of this
interval is determined by application of the sampling theorem
from information theory to the particular IBV in question.
In recent years there has been much work done in
the area of spectral analysis of time signals by means of
digital computers. It is characterized by such descriptions
as "digital filtering" and "digital signal processing," and.
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some of the results of this work are now available in book
form.* The reader is referred to these sources for further
information. It should be noted that digital spectral
analysis generally requires substantial computational re-
sources, and may be difficult to use for purposes of real-
time performance verification.
*See, for example, Digital Signal Processing, L. R. Rabiner
and C. M. Rader, IEEE Press, Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers, Inc., N.Y.
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B3.0 CLASS 2 MOP's
Class 2 MOP's are those wherein information from
both input and output signals of a single IBV are utilized in
MOP calculation. This class is usually resorted to when
deterministic statements cannot be made about the IBV out-
put.alone.
In order to use Class 2 techniques for performance
verification, it is generally necessary to know a priori,
the nominal transfer function of the IBV. This transfer
function may be known in either the time or the frequency
domain, and for verification purposes, it is assumed to
completely characterize the operation of the IBV. The know-
ledge of the nominal transfer function permits calculation
of what the IBV output should be given the input, or (in
some cases), calculation of what the input should be given
the output, and thus, verification of the correct operation
of the IBV is possible for any particular actual sets of
input and output information. In this discussion, certain
assumptions are made regarding the integrity of IBV input and
output signals and regarding the linearity of IBV internal
operations.
B3.1 Inverse Transform Techniques
It can be seen from Figure B3.1 that under certain
circumstances, a Class 2 MOP can be represented in the complex
frequency domain as
MOP = actual input - computed input
= W(s) - X(s)
G(s)
If the IBV has a simple transfer function, such as
the case with an amplifier with constant gain A, we get
MOP = w(t) - x(t)
A
where g(t) = A; therefore, g- (t) = 1
A
This is the case chosen for the example shown in Table B1.0.
The example is sufficiently simple that no further explana-
tion seems necessary. It is noteworthy that in this example,
inaccuracies in MOP calculation may be significant because
both w(t) and x(t) are represented by numbers with inherent
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IBV
IBV INPUT (t) TRANSFER IBV OUTPUT SIGNALFUNCTION tIBV OUTPUT SIGNAL TRANSFER FUNCTION
SIGNAL W(s) G(s) X(s) (STORED CONSTANT)
g(t)
RELATIONSHIPS:
W(s) = La Place Transform of w(t) = :t (w(t)) X(s) = W(s)G(t)
X(s) = La Place Transform of x(t) = -.- (x(t)) x(t) = -I {G(s)W(s)}
G(s) = X(s) = Transfer Function of IBV t
W(s) x(t) = g(t-T)w(T)dT
Figure B3.1. Class 2 MOP Block Diagram
measurement noise, and the resulting MOP value may contain
cumulative errors due to this noise. This inaccuracy
phenomenon is typical of Class 2 MOP extraction techniques.
Class 1 techniques are less affected by the inaccuracy
problem because only one of two numbers used in forming a
difference is contaminated by noise (one of the numbers is
typically an a priori-determined constant).
B3.2 Correlation Techniques
In this technique, the actual value of the IBV im-
pulse response function h(t) is calculated from IBV inputs
and outputs and compared with the a priori-known reference
value for h(t), which we call hR(t). The measure of perform-
ance is then the difference between these:
MOP = hT(t) - h R ( t)
where hT(t) is the response function obtained with the aid of
a known input signal wT(t) having duration T and satisfying
certain general properties. In fact, wT(t) can take the form
of a pseudorandom noise signal, generated for the purpose of
stimulating the IBV appropriately.
In this case, hT(t) may be calculated from the IBV
input and output signals, and is (in continuous-time repre-
sentation)
T
hT (t) = w T(T) x (t-T)dT
0
In other words, hT(t) is calculated as the convolution
integral of w(t) and x(t) in order to obtain the desired MOP.
Although a digital computer can compute a numerical approxi-
mation of hT (t) from the numbers IXijkl and Wijk, the
operation requires substantial computational resources and
may be difficult to use if real-time verification is a require-
ment. The particular technique just discussed is sometimes
used in checking of digital data communication channels.
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B4.0 CLASS 3 MOP's
Class 3 MOP's are those computed using informa-
tion from the outputs only of multiple (two or more) similar
IBV's, where the similar IBV's are assumed to share the
same input signals. The situation is described in Figure
B4.0. This class of MOP's operates on the principle that
similar IBV's, operating on the same input, should produce
identical outputs. If they don't, at least one of the IBV's
in the collection must have failed.
B4.1 Compare-Two Techniques
Compare-Two techniques apply when there are only
two IBV's whose individual outputs, or individual MOP's de-
rived from outputs, are compared. A collection-IBV MOP is
developed for which the value is the difference between
respective individual MOP's. Essentially, if this difference
is small, the collection-IBV (and also both individual IBV's)
is assumed to be good; otherwise, the collection-IBV (and,
therefore, one or the other of the individual IBV's) is
assumed to be bad. Mathematical representations of this are
shown in Table B1.0.
Note that with this technique, as with all Class 3
techniques, status resolution may not be required. Also note
that with this technique, as with all other Class 3 techniques,
it is not necessary to know, a priori, what the outputs of the
two IBV's should be; instead, it is sufficient to know that
the two outputs should be about the same with respect to
their essential features, or MOP's.
The Compare-Two technique can be quite simple to
implement, and it is fairly commonly used. For instance, the
Compare-Two technique is currently used as part of the verifi-
cation process for dual arithmetic units in some models of
the IBM 370 central processing units.
The technique has, however, one potentially serious
drawback. It is not possible to tell which of the two IBV's
in the pair is bad. There are some limited circumstances
where this information is not necessary. For most applica-
tions, this represents vital information.
B4.2 Crosspower Spectral Analysis Techniques
Crosspower Spectral Analysis is the general name
given to techniques which essentially use the Compare-Two
technique on the output of two similar IBV's, but where the
individual MOP's are described in the frequency domain. For
example, it may be desired to compare the power spectra of
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Figure B4.0. Class 3 MOP Extraction Techniques
two IBV's, which, if operating properly, should have essen-
tially the same output power in defined frequency bands.
This might be the case with dual stable oscillators, for
instance. For this purpose, the coherence function defined
in Table B1.0 is possibly a good choice for collection-IBV
MOP.
It should be apparent from examination of the defi-
nition of coherence function that the calculation of this MOP
on a general purpose digital computer is not a simple matter.
The stored program necessary to realize the function will be
fairly large, and program execution time will be considerable.
Thus, it appears that the coherence function, or in general,
any MOP of the Crosspower Spectral Analysis type, is likely
to prove unsuitable for real-time performance verification
purposes.
B4.3 Voting Techniques
Voting is the only technique of Class 3 MOP extrac-
tion techniques in which the outputs of more than two IBV's
are used in calculating a collection-IBV MOP. Table B1.0
shows an attempt to characterize the voting technique in
mathematical terms, using the three IBV case for simplicity.
In this technique, the MOP is the mutual differ-
ences between the IBV outputs. This is often times modified
to include the kind of sequential consistency described for
Coding Techniques, thus, the MOP distinguishes between errors
and failures. Note that the discussion of this technique
has assumed a digital application. This is a limitation of
this technique in the general sense. Its analog implementation
is quite difficult.
Many different versions of the voting technique
are possible, and the technique is sometimes used where
additional decision-making reliability is judged to be worth
the cost of triple (or higher) levels of redundancy. Imple-
mentation of the technique via general purpose digital com-
puter can be quite simple, especially if the implementation
computer has suitable "bit fiddling" capabilities in its
instruction set. These capabilities tend to facilitate the
programming of Boolean functions which define the collection-
IBV MOP. This technique is being used on the GN&C computers.
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